

THEOLOGY

A Monthly Journal of Historic Christianity

Edited by the DEAN OF WINCHESTER, THE DEANERY, WINCHESTER, to whom all editorial matters should be addressed.

Vol. XXII

MAY, 1931

No. 131

EDITORIAL

Discourses and Letters of Bishop Burge is the title of a compilation which will serve to keep alive the memory of a very fragrant personality, and to introduce him, we hope, to many who never knew him. The work has been edited by his friend, Lord Charnwood, who has also prefixed a simple and sufficient Memoir. It is not often that one who has been so entirely thorough and successful in scholastic work is able to pass so quickly, and apparently so easily, into being a great Bishop. But Burge did; and the secret is made plain in these pages. They reveal a character in which the two qualities of sympathy and of detachment are blended in a rare proportion, with the result that the life grows year by year into an ever deeper love of God and of man. Like Sophocles, he was one

who made the whole world loyal

Less by kingly power than grace;

and it was this which gave him so clear an insight into the forces at work after the war in the Church of England, and so happy a way of drawing them into common work. A signal instance of this occurred after the first Anglo-Catholic Congress of 1920. Burge realized, as did few others in like position, the significance of the movement and what it might contribute to the life of the Church as a whole. He saw that on the one hand it was intended by its promoters as a reaction against the undue emphasis which many of the clergy were inclined to lay on matters of ceremonial, and on the other that it represented an intellectual outlook that was at once Catholic and liberal. On this basis he initiated conferences with those principally concerned; and one of their results was the eventual establishment of the Archbishops' Doctrinal Commission,* over whose first sessions he himself presided. In the minds of all who knew him then, or in his earlier days at Oxford or at Winchester, he left an indelible impression of strength, wisdom, and charm; and from the pages of this volume his personality still speaks to make us rejoice.

* Lord Charnwood desires it to be pointed out that the paper in this volume entitled "The Doctrine of the Trinity" is wrongly attributed to Bishop Burge. It was found among his papers, having been circulated to members of the Commission by one of them who had written it.

SOLOVIEV'S EASTER LETTERS

I. EASTER WEEK: CHRIST IS RISEN

THE first decisive victory of life over death !

In the unceasing warfare between the two—between living spirit and dead matter—lies the essence of the world's history. The spirit of life had gained many victories before the resurrection of Christ; yet all these victories were but half victories. After each of them the foe succeeded in establishing and consolidating his real actual dominion above the outwardly triumphant new forms of life. What a seemingly great victory of life it was when in the midst of inert inorganic matter myriads of living creatures, the first embryos of the vegetable and animal kingdom, began swarming and stirring! Living force gets the upper hand over inert elements, uses them as material for its new forms, transforms mechanical processes into obedient weapons for organic aims. And what an immense, ever-growing wealth of forms, what a complexity and daring in the construction of the tiniest zoophytes as well as of the giants of the tropical fauna and flora! But death only laughs at this magnificent pageant. Death is realistic. Beautiful forms and symbols have no charm for her; forebodings and prophecies do not stop her. She knows that the beauty of Nature is only a vivid, many-coloured pall on a continually decaying corpse. Is Nature immortal? What a constant illusion! It only seems immortal at a superficial glance, for the bystander, who mistakes the new momentary life for the continuation of the former one. We often speak of Nature as dying and eternally reviving. This is a misuse of words. If that which is born to-day is not the same that perished yesterday, if it is something quite new, wherein is there a resurrection? Out of an innumerable quantity of mortal lives we can in no wise create a single immortal one.

The life of Nature is a compromise between Death and Immortality. Death takes to itself all individual living beings and gives up to immortality only the general types of life. This particular plant or animal is inevitably doomed to perish after a momentary existence; but this type of vegetable or animal life, this species of organism remains. Death makes use for its own purpose of God's commandment to all living beings: "To be fruitful and multiply and to fill the waters and the air." Multiply, not to develop, establish, and immortalize your own life, but only to make it possible for you to disappear all the more quickly, so that others may push you out and replace you. You are only to fill the earth with your mortal remains, you must only be a bridge for the next generation, which, in

its stead, will become a bridge for those coming after it, etc. Instead of life and immortality, we only see an unceasing series of bridges. It is true that these bridges are not built in vain; it is true that along this deathly highway a creative spirit is advancing towards a given aim. But why is it indispensable that it should march forward only over forgotten graves? Why, if its aim be good, must the means of achieving it be evil? Why this ever recurring illusion of mortal life?

No, this seeming life is but the symbol and the firstfruit of true life. The organization of visible Nature is no decisive victory of the living spirit over death; it is only a *preparation* for the final attainment.

The first real step towards victory was the appearance of a reasonable being in the midst of animal life. Because men possess a mentality capable of seeing things clearly and generalizing, life ceases being but a well-adapted process for the development of the species. It becomes also a well-adapted outlay of individual strength.

“Your mighty thought arrests and gives force
To all the fluctuating movements of fleeting time.”

The war between life and death enters upon a new phase from the moment that it is being waged by creatures that not only live and die, but also meditate about life and death. Such thoughts are in themselves no victory, but they are the necessary weapons to attain victory. The heroes of human thought, the great wise men of the East and the West, were preparing the final victory. They themselves did not conquer death; they died and did not rise from the dead. It will suffice to name the two greatest among them. The teaching of Buddha was, in fact, a refusal of the struggle. He taught indifference towards life and death, and his death had nothing remarkable in it. Socrates did not refuse the strife. He struggled bravely, and his death was an honourable retreat to a realm where his foe could not enter. However, the trophies of victory remained in the hands of the foe. Physical force is inevitably conquered by death; but mental force alone is also not sufficient to be victorious over death. Only moral force, without end or limit, can give absolute fulness to life; only it can exclude all disintegration. Therefore it alone cannot admit that living man should be disintegrated in two: the incorporate spirit and the corruptible body.

The crucified Son of God, feeling Himself forsaken by God and by men, and still praying for His foes, had no limits to His spiritual force. Therefore no atom of His being could remain the prey of death.

We die, because our spiritual strength, which is hampered by our sins and passions, proves insufficient to engulf, incorporate, and transform our outward corporal being; this falls off, and our inborn immortality becomes but a partial one (in expectation of that final resurrection, which we can receive only through Christ). Only our inner being remains immortal, only our spirit. The resurrection of Christ was complete:

"And as they spake these things he himself stood in the midst of them and saith unto them: 'Peace be unto you.' But they were terrified and affrighted and supposed that they had beheld a spirit. And he said unto them: 'Why are ye troubled, and wherefore do reasonings arise in your heart? See my hands and my feet, that it is I, myself. Handle me and see, for a spirit hath not flesh and bones, as ye behold me having.' And when he had said this, he showed them his hands and his feet. And while they still disbelieved for joy and wondered, he said unto them: 'Have you here anything to eat?' And they gave him a piece of broiled fish. And he took it and did eat before them" (Luke xxiv. 36-43).

The spiritual strength which in Christ was infinite and free from all limitations naturally rose after His resurrection above all outward limitations: first of all above an exclusively spiritual being, as opposed to physical existence.

The risen Christ *is more than spirit*. A spirit has no flesh and bones; a spirit partakes not of food. He is a spirit *eternally incarnate*. Christ in the complete fulness of His inner physical being unites all the positive capacities of physical existence without any of its outward limitations. *All that is living* is retained in him. All that is mortal is completely and finally conquered. The resurrection of Christ is a decisive victory of life over death, of the positive principle over the negative one, and, therefore, it is the triumph of reason within the world. It is a miracle only in the same sense in which every kind of new manifestation, everything unusual and unseen before, appears to us to be a miracle, makes us marvel. If we should look only upon the separate new stages of the world's processes, forgetting to generalize them as a whole, we should be inclined to look upon each one of them as a miracle. Just as the appearance of the first living organism in the midst of inorganic nature, and later on the appearance of the first reasonable being in the midst of dumb creation, was a miracle, just so the appearance of the first completely spiritual man, *i.e.*—man who was not subject to death—the firstfruit among the dead—was a miracle.

If the preliminary victories of life over death were miracles, we must admit that the final victory was a miracle too. How-

ever, what seems to us to be a miracle can be understood as a completely natural, necessary, and reasonable event. The truth of Christ's resurrection is a complete truth, not only as a fulfilment of faith, but also as a fulfilment of reason as well. If Christ had not risen, if Caiaphas had been in the right and Herod and Pontius Pilate wise, the universe would have been a senseless cosmos, a kingdom of evil, deception, and death. The issue lay not in the cessation of one individual life, but in the cessation of true life, the life of perfect righteousness. If such a life had been unable to overcome the foe, what hope would there have remained for the future?

If Christ had not risen, who could ever hope to rise?

Christ is risen.

Easter Sunday, 1897.

II. WEEK DEDICATED TO THE HISTORY OF ST. THOMAS: CONSCIENTIOUS UNBELIEF

It would be very sad if the truths of faith were evident to all at first sight. If this were so, they would not be objects of *faith*. God, the salvation of the soul, the resurrection of all, are *indubitably true*, but their certainty is not obviously conspicuous; they are not so plainly evident that every mind should be constrained to accept them as it accepts a mathematical axiom or a personally observed fact. Only that which is of little value is plainly obvious. Mathematical axioms may have a general importance, but morally they are indifferent. Always and everywhere twice two will make four, but no one will be a whit the better because of this. Facts we have observed personally may have a greater interest for us, but they are quite devoid of universal value, they are limited and transient. I see that to-day in Moscow it is a warm, sunny day. This is obvious, and it has a certain interest for me, but it cannot be transformed and construed into a permanent truth, invariable for all times and places—it is a fact that is undoubtedly true only for the present moment and place. In the same manner every plainly obvious fact is either formal, as mathematics, or casual, as to-day's bright, sunny day in Moscow.

Everything that is universal, inwardly valuable, and vitally important is never obviously conspicuous to the mind and the outward senses. It were a sign of nearly unbelievable, or at any rate very rare obtuseness to deny it all because of this, and to accept as true and certain only facts of mathematical exactitude, or those that can be personally proved by our senses. Usually the truths of faith are denied beforehand, not because of the coarseness of our mind, but because of the cunning of

our will. Our heart does not love to meditate on God, the salvation of the soul, the resurrection of the body; we have no desire that these truths should actually exist. Life is easier, simpler without them; it is better not to think of them. And so the mind does not find it difficult to find a pretext not to think at all, or, at best, not to take them into serious consideration. All these belong to the category of things that can be proved neither by the brain nor by experience, therefore they are not certain, they are fantastic.

Such a kind of unbelief is, in fact, uncertain of its own statements, and therefore it is more or less inimically irritated against things the existence of which it denies. And this very animosity betrays it. For how can you be angry against what does not exist? This type of unbelief is not *conscientious*. In the best of cases it is founded on a pusillanimous refusal to make a mental effort, to coerce the will, so as to grasp and retain the truth which lies beyond the limits of mathematical or conspicuous facts.

But there also exists another kind of unbelief, a thoroughly conscientious unbelief. Its source lies in no moral defect, but in a certain psychological and temperamental peculiarity. A typical representative of this kind of unbelief has been described to us in the Gospel, the unbelief of St. Thomas:

"But Thomas, one of the twelve, called Didymus, was not with them when Jesus came. The other disciples, therefore, said unto him: 'We have seen the Lord.' But he said unto them: 'Except I shall see in his hand the print of the nails, and put my hand into his side, I will not believe.' And after eight days again his disciples were within, and Thomas with them. Jesus cometh, the doors being shut, and stood in the midst, and said: 'Peace be unto you.' Then saith he to Thomas: 'Reach hither thy finger and see my hands, and reach hither thy hand and put it into my side, and be not faithless, but believing.' Thomas answered and said unto him: 'My Lord and my God.' Jesus saith unto him: 'Because thou hast seen me thou hast believed; blessed are they that have not seen and *yet* have believed'" (John xx. 24-29).

If St. Thomas's unbelief had proceeded from the coarse materialism which brings down all truth to the level of palpable obviousness, he would when becoming personally convinced of the resurrection have found some kind of materialistic explanation for it; he would not have cried out: "My Lord and my God." From the standpoint of outward sensual certainty the wounds of the nail-prints and of the sword did not prove Christ's Divinity.

Still clearer is it that the unbelief of St. Thomas was not

caused by some moral defect, by his being hostile towards truth. It was love of truth that had attracted him to Christ and had kindled in him a boundless loyalty towards his Master. When Christ, before His last journey to Jerusalem, refused to take into consideration the deadly danger that was threatening Him, St. Thomas exclaimed: "Let us also go, that we may die with him" (John xi. 16).

It is not by chance that these words have been handed down to us in the Gospels. In this impetuous exclamation of heartfelt loyalty we find an explanation of the psychological cause of St. Thomas's unbelief. His impetuous nature, always running on ahead of events, demands the immediate realization of the once accepted truth. He cannot be satisfied with abstract certainty, or with the testimony of others. He wants to be convinced personally, here, now, to make sure for himself, to experience the actual power of the truth, to verify the truth by fact. Till this is done, he refuses to believe: "Except I shall see, I will not believe."

But once having seen, he believes wholeheartedly, not only what he has seen, but also what he has not seen, what cannot be seen. The palpable fact has not been the foundation of his faith, but only proof of it.

A temporary conscientious unbelief, accepted as a means of being finally and fully convinced of the truth, does not merit any moral blame. Christ did not accuse St. Thomas, but convinced him in the way which he desired. Those who do not need such proof, who believe without investigating, may be no better than St. Thomas. They are only happier: "Blessed are those who believe without having seen." But the blessedness of unshaken, peaceful faith lays an obligation on those who possess it to condescend to their less fortunate brethren.

At periods of ever-spreading unbelief we must be careful to note the kind of unbelief we have to do with. If it is a coarsely materialistic, animal-like unbelief—an unbelief incapable of rising to the conception of truth—it is no use arguing with it: "Non ragionar di lor, ma guarda et passa." If it is a cunning unbelief, consciously misusing certain half-truths out of hostile fear of the full truth, then we must watch this serpent, carefully revealing all its subtle shifts, without anger or fear. And lastly, we may have to do with a purely human conscientious unbelief, which is only thirsting to be fully and finally convinced of perfect truth. This is the kind of unbelief of the Apostle Thomas, and it has the full right that we should accept it. If we cannot give to such persons the proof of truth which they demand in the manner Christ did, we must still be very careful not to

accuse them or throw them off. There is little doubt that these pseudo-unbelievers will precede in the Kingdom of God a great number of pseudo-believers.

Moscow, 1897.

III. WEEK DEDICATED TO THE MEMORY OF THE WOMEN GOING FORTH TO MEET THE RISEN CHRIST: THE FEMININE PROBLEM.

This problem occupies by no means the last place among all the "problems" with which we are preparing to meet the twentieth century.

According to the opinion of a certain student of theology all love can be divided into two categories: sincere and insincere love. In the same manner problems can be divided into serious and trivial ones. We consider serious those problems which are representative of some actual fact which has transformed the life and consciousness of men, which has produced a change that has been general, and which, consequently, is socially important. The feminine problem must be ranked among the serious ones, because it is the outcome of such a change. A great number of women and girls are no more satisfied with the duties of family life. They are incapable of remaining at home quietly, occupying themselves with household affairs. The spiritual restlessness which has taken possession of them often manifests itself in a pitiful, comical manner. But, nevertheless, it is there, it exists and grows, and no reasoning or ridicule can lay it aside. And truly, how are we to answer the human being who tells us: "Such a life does not satisfy me; it is not enough for me; I do not want to be only a means of giving birth to other creatures and of educating them; I want to live for myself as well; I want to have my own aim"? *What* this aim is to be, *what* it is that these women actually want to have, is still quite unclear even to themselves. One thing only is clear: they do not want the former order of things; they have broken with it forever.

The part played by woman in history corresponds very closely to the physiological part she plays in life. Woman herself cannot conceive a new life. But the life conceived by another or through another she preserves and brings forth into God's world. Without her participation nothing would be produced in the world. The same principle holds true regarding spiritual life and its leading ideas, no less than it does in physical life. For the better accomplishment of her task in the universal history of mankind woman has been endowed with two opposite characteristic qualities. She combines a conservative spirit with inconstancy. The popular proverb says: "Woman is

like a bag; she will carry whatever you put in;" but it must be completed by the following words—the result of universal experience: "Women thirst for novelty; they are afraid of constant peace."

During the epochs when vital ideas conceived, brought forth, and carried out in preceding generations by women still dominate men and give importance to their existence—are still necessary to them—women remain satisfied with their historical mission, and social conservatism characterizes them. The other side of their nature—their love of novelty—finds an outlet only individually in their infatuation for new fashions and in the part played by the tender passion in their personal life.

But during other epochs, when the old forms of vital principles have run dry and become exhausted, when the demand for the birth of new ideas has grown rife, women experience more strongly, more decisively than men (even though not before them), a dissatisfaction with the traditional order of life. It is they who long to overstep the established boundaries, who go forth to meet the coming day. But before finding the true path they eagerly snatch at all they can lay hands on. Thus Mary Magdalene, before she found Christ, had fallen under the dominion of seven demons. Perhaps we shall be able to count the same number for the false ideas which in turn or simultaneously have taken possession of contemporary woman. Verily, they are seven: The demon of free love, the demon of political propaganda, the demon of putting natural science in the place of God, the demon of neglect of outward appearance,* the demon of compulsory celibacy, the demon of economic materialism, the demon of æsthetic decadence.

All these demons can deceive and torture, but they cannot truly satisfy, a woman's soul any more than a man's. True satisfaction can be found only in Truth, which is not to-day's or yesterday's, because it is eternal.

But the fact is that man's inner spiritual conception of eternal truth outgrows some of the temporary forms through which that truth acted and manifested itself. Of course it would be a childish illusion to expect a quite new, unheard-of word. The only word of truth has been spoken, and we shall hear no other. It is not the word which has grown old, but our conception of it. A new understanding, conception, and realization of the Eternal Word of Truth is always possible, and, at the present moment, it is growing inevitable. The restlessness of woman's soul is a symptom of this need, a symptom that this need will soon be satisfied.

* This is characteristic of the followers of Tolstoy, who protested against all the refinements of civilization, cleanliness among others. (Note of translator.)

The feminine problem can be solved, just as all other serious problems, only in Christianity, a Christianity more purely understood and conceived, a revived Christianity. Women were the first to go out and meet the risen Christ.

The meaning of the contemporary feminine movement is to prepare (after the seven demons shall have been expelled) new women going forth to meet the coming resurrection of Christianity.

Moscow, 1897.

"THE HOUSE THAT JEANS BUILT"*

WHEN Professor Einstein arrived in New York harbour the other day, before he left the boat he was asked to give his impressions of the American girl. American reporters do these things. But the Professor was able to reply without any of the hesitation most of us would feel. He gave an impromptu (and probably quite new) description of the American girl as "an oval mass of bent space-time being thrown off like electrons from swiftly rotating nithol-watts with all the speed of an idzol."

The definition will serve my purpose better perhaps than it did the reporters'. I want you to notice about it, first, that it is not immediately apparent whether approval or criticism is being conveyed; second, that it uses no terms that do not imply measurement or that imply anything more than measurement; third, that the terms used are fantastically unfamiliar.

These points are honourable characteristics of the new physics. Physical investigation is proceeding under a threefold vow: that it will avoid qualitative judgments, that it will confine itself to measurement, and (especially) that it will not cramp its outlook by conforming to the normal accepted standards of measurement, which have been discovered to represent only a special case of a general law.

As I shall try to develop this and to draw one or two conclusions, I may as well anticipate an objection. It may be said with much force that all this discussion about the vast universe and the tiny electron is diverting attention away from the progress which is being made in scientific fields other than physics—in biology and experimental psychology for instance. True, it is one-sided; but for all that I suggest it deserves the interest it is attracting. For if the conclusions which are being drawn from physics are well-founded they must react through

* A paper read to the South Molton Ruridecanal Chapter.

all the realm of knowledge, and no student of any aspect of Nature will be inclined to claim that the scientific method of approach alone delivers to him the facts with which he deals.

* * * * *

How shall we start? We might well start, as the story of man does, with an apple; and in the Socratic manner. What is an apple?

You tell me that it is a round coloured fruit about two inches in diameter, crisp and juicy, and possessing a distinctive taste.

Good! That is Eve's idea of an apple, and mine. But I rather want Sir Isaac Newton's. Already you are mixing up quality with quantity; for when you spoke of colour and taste you were referring to things that were going on in your retina and palate. The object may *cause* these impressions but does not *contain* them. What (if anything) is left of the apple when you are not there?

The scientist of yesterday would answer this question readily. He would say, when you are not there the apple has properties which can be measured: length, breadth, height, mass, velocity, radio-activity, and so on. These constitute the inner nature, the *core*, of the apple.

To-day, he is less positive. He finds to his surprise that the length, breadth, height, etc., of the object depend on the onlooker apparently as much as do its colour and taste, though in a different way. It begins to look as though, in the words of *Punch*, "There ain't going to be no core."

Of course it would not be right to say that this is the only answer that physics can now give us. It can give us a set of symbols, an algebraic apple containing sufficient variable terms to represent the apple from any point of view. That is why Sir James Jeans has said that the Universe appeared to be the work of a Mathematician. He said it (as I respectfully believe) with his tongue in his cheek. When he studies apples in his laboratory they are equations; but when he goes down to lunch they become real apples again. He no more believes than anyone else that reality has been or can be reduced to mathematics.

Immediately, then, we are faced with the fact that present-day science demands extra-scientific support. Confidence in the test-tube and the thermometer has been shaken to its foundations. I must now try to show in more detail how this admission has been forced on modern thought.

Let us first paddle for a few minutes in the shallow end of the Relativity theory.

We are reminded that all our physical knowledge is disclosed by measurement. (Even our sense of colour is a method of registering the differences of wave-interval in light-vibrations.) We are then told that our measuring instruments cannot be trusted. This is not their fault or ours; it is due to a game of hide-and-seek which Nature is playing with us.

A simple example of this may be deduced from the Fitzgerald Contraction. It is known that all things contract slightly in the direction of their motion. Heat expands a thing. Movement contracts it. A train is shorter when travelling between stations than when standing in one. Very well; let us measure the contraction. We place our tape-measure along the stationary train first, and then along it as it travels. What difference is shown? None at all; because the tape-measure has also contracted. Throw it aside and trust to your eyes. You glance along the train as it stands still, and then jump on board, climb to the roof, and glance along it as it moves. Do you notice the difference? No; the lens of your eye, being in movement, has unfortunately contracted just enough to give you again a nil result.

Never mind; you need not jump on the train at all. Why not stay on the platform and judge from there in both cases? This time you are successful. If your eyes were a billion times as keen as they are, you would notice that the train shrinks as it leaves you.

But this little victory of observation carries with it some disturbing reflections. It means that your idea of the train's real length is (however slightly) different from the engine-driver's. And if you care to push the matter further, you will find that the difference is not only in length; it is found in the weight, mass, colour, shape, and the note emitted by the whistle.

Every difference of relative movement between the onlooker and the train will give an entirely different account of the physical properties of that train.

Which account is the right one?

Neither, says Relativity. Choose which you like; only, when you have chosen, stick to your choice. Does the dog wag the tail or the tail wag the dog? It doesn't matter, but if you choose to say the tail wags the dog you must make the tip of the tail your observation point from which you will survey the Universe as it waves to and fro. Your Universe will then be more complicated than mine, but I have no other criticism to pass on it.

Men once imagined that the sun and stars went round the earth. They were perfectly right. The tail was wagging the dog. The Church was choosing for her frame of reference the

scene of her conflict. But then arose Copernicus saying that the earth moved round the sun, followed by Galileo who insisted that this conception ran contrary to the teaching of the Church but was nevertheless true. Here was a genuine case of men being right in what they affirm and wrong in what they deny. We are still pre-Copernicans when we speak of sunrise and sunset, using terms which are not figures of speech but sternly accurate statements of fact, assuming that the earth stands still (and this is as good an assumption as any). Where Copernicus and Galileo are helpful is in making our astronomical mathematics easier.

It is fortunately improbable that you will agree with me on this point, and we might easily argue the matter till earth-set, but I am only drawing attention to the extremely generalized basis of present-day physical study. We were ready, I think, to give up the colour and taste of the apple, but not so ready to consider its shape and substance as personal impressions. But who now will tell us what its shape and substance really are? Say what shape you would like it to be; start moving at a relative speed which will show it to you in that shape; and then have a look round at your Universe! If you want to share it with anyone else, you must resort to equations.

By a different road the same goal is reached by the students of the particle.

We could start with our idea of a man.

He is, we say, a spiritual being, made in the image and likeness of God, composed of body and soul, whose body is his soul's instrument.

But this idea of him is not reached by analysis. Psychology is wanting to suggest to us that the terms God and soul may be mental "projections," without substantial reality behind them. Let us take humbler ground, and start with the study of man's mental states.

But we cannot do that until we have attended to the claim of biology that man's mental states are incidental products of the long struggle that has made him what he is. Let us defer psychology until we have had a look at man's history.

To begin any such study we must define our species; and we can only define him by noting his characteristic attributes. Physiology therefore must come logically before biology; and before physiology we ought at any rate to have some knowledge of the constituents which make up the organs and limbs of physiological study. So we must, after all, begin with chemistry.

Shall we then settle down to a catalogue of carbohydrates and other ingredients? Not unless we know what we are talking about, and to ensure this we must classify the molecular groups named by chemistry; and this will bring us to our table of the

elements. Elements are atomic, and we seem at last to have got down to a real safe starting-point. We have our atom of hydrogen, and our atom of oxygen, and our atom of carbon, each with its own properties, upon which we will build up our idea of a man. But we are interrupted.

"I also," breaks in the student of electricity, "have lately been studying the properties of the atom. I find that its most interesting property is the fact that it is not there. It has no more existence than the Equator, being the *imaginary* boundary which determines the normal movements of the electrons inside it. Electrons, surely, are the real stuff of existence."

"Are you quite sure that they are?" asks the inventor of a Quantum Theory. "Most of us have now come to the conclusion that this is quite a wrong account of the electron. It is an effect of wave-motion. When you see an eddy of wind crossing a corn-field you can follow the waves along with your eye and notice that any one wave remains the same wave as it passes from wheat to barley and from barley to oats. Yet that wave is not a *thing*, in the usual sense of the word, as it is changing its substance all the time. It is an effect of wave-motion in a medium. So is the electron."

It remains now to study the properties of the medium in which this wave-motion is taking place, and to discover that the only property which it can be observed to possess is the fact that the wave-motion is taking place in it.

Analysis has not left us much of the man that we started with! This is the soul that controls the mind that surveys the body that owns the limbs that are made of the constituents that hold the molecules that attract the atoms that bound the electrons that exhibit the waves that *satisfy the equations* that lie in the house that Jeans built.

We are again brought to a phantom-universe which only mathematics can express.

I have already hinted at one negative result of this conclusion. It makes us inclined to think kindly of faith and intuition, which at any rate give us real apples and real men. May I suggest that it has also a negative but important bearing on sacramental controversy?

Consider the historic doctrine of the Incarnation and the sacraments. We group the Incarnation with the sacraments because we believe the latter to be congruous with the former. In both we see God supervening another order upon the normal order; so that as the Manhood of the Son of God contains Deity without ceasing to follow the laws of Manhood, so the sacrament of the Altar displays bread and wine suffused with Deity without transformation of the natural elements.

This I take to be the doctrine which the Bishop of Birmingham deplures. He generally confines his strictures to the sacramental doctrine, but it would not be difficult to show both by quotation and by logic that they reflect back upon the doctrine of the Incarnation as historically held. It is true also that before criticizing the sacramental doctrine he states it in a form in which no theologian would support it. Catholic teaching does not claim that the efficient ultimate cause of the change which takes place is either the priesthood of the celebrant or the formula used by him. The priesthood and the formula are *contingent requirements*. I cannot get my breakfast, normally, without coming downstairs, but I do not owe my breakfast to the stairs.

But apart from this incidental and rather obvious point, the Bishop's attitude is open to the objection that it appeals to a court which refuses to deal with this kind of case. Perhaps we may make this clear by imagining, with all the reverence the subject demands, a debate on the Holy Eucharist, between St. Thomas Aquinas, Dr. Barnes, and Professor Einstein.

St. Thomas (for once) does not argue. "Adoro Te devote, latens Deitas, quae sub his figuris vere latitas." This act of adoration is the only contribution he makes to the discussion. The Bishop appeals to the scientist for support for his view that this kind of conviction must now be relinquished. What is actually present is simply bread, and by bread the Bishop of course means the familiar food of that name. What satisfaction would he be likely to get from Einstein? Might not the reply be rather on these lines?

"My lord, am I being called in as a scientist or as a man? If I am asked to give a scientific verdict, I must concede that St. Thomas's attitude passes my comprehension, but I must add that your own attitude seems no less strange. You say that this object is bread—that is, a well-known substance used for food, which you think of as soft and white and sustaining. I congratulate you on the poetic imagination which allows such a daring simplification. For me, alas! it is a complex of quantitative relationships, and my science will not permit me to affirm anything more about it. If I am to agree with *your* idea of it, I must drop being the scientist and start being the man. I must cease to analyze (or even to synthesize, if the synthesis is mathematical) and begin to use intuition. But the moment I start intuitively apprehending it as ordinary bread I am no longer in a position to criticize St. Thomas for intuitively apprehending it as the vehicle of a Divine presence."

The grounds for believing in the Divine presence lie elsewhere.

One is merely concerned here to point out that Dr. Barnes gives us no ground for doubting it. His appeal fails, as it lies outside the area of modern scientific thought.

I trust that the above argument will not be mistaken as a form of the argument that science is concerned with phenomena, while religion is concerned only with values. This leads straight to a purely subjective view of religion. It is the "high-brow" way of saying we are all going the same way. "If St. Thomas likes to believe that there is a Divine presence, why disturb him? It does him good and does you no harm."

This subtle heresy spreads like an epidemic. You can divest any term of meaning by tacking on the phrase "the value of" in front of it. The Eucharist "has the value of Jesus" for us. Jesus "has the value of God" for us. What is the meaning of these statements if the Eucharist is not Jesus, and if Jesus is not God? Personally, I think I would prefer to meet a man who held that the sentences of the Apostles' Creed were fabrications than a man who held that they were a list of beautiful uplifting irrelevancies.

Fortunately the new outlook helps us here also. When we meet one who tells us that we differ only on values and not on facts, we can ask him whether the difference between a carrot and a turnip is a difference of value or a difference of fact. I think he will certainly say that it is a difference of fact. We can then ask him where he gets his fact from. Certainly not from science, for science can only provide us with two pages of calculations, which no one, not even the physicist who made them, would recognize as what we mean when we name a carrot and a turnip. The world around us is crammed with good substantial facts which science cannot begin to deal with until it has reduced them to ghosts. How then can it be maintained that science enjoys the whole realm of phenomena?

Do let us maintain that religion supplies us with truths as well as, and prior to, supplying us with values. The only respectable parentage for a feeling is a fact.

"The world is so full of a number of *things*
That—I'm sure we should all be as happy as kings."

The new outlook has an interesting bearing on the perennial problem of free will.

Of course, if it is decided (without reference to me) what I am to do to-morrow, then all religious questions are settled. The Ten Commandments, the Eight Beatitudes, the Seven Deadly Sins, would be alike meaningless catalogues of things indifferent in themselves; for if they have meaning they mean responsibility, and I am only responsible if I am free.

I am sure they have meaning and I am sure I am free, but the contrary case is strong.

The Victorians were bewitched, spellbound, by the uniformity of Nature. They were beginning to make elaborate machines, and were proud of them. They found that if you pulled the right lever the right thing happened. So Nature was personified as the flawless Machine, in which events were happening all the time because they had to happen. This was not an argument for fatalism, or if so a singularly poor one. As Dr. Streeter asks, Who made the machine? Who pulls the levers? But it served to crystallize a sentiment for a generation which liked to believe it had banished sentiment from its thought.

And we do depend on Nature's uniformity. A depression from Iceland, moving towards the British Isles, if observed to-night will, we feel sure, produce its familiar performance to-morrow. If we assume the causes we must bow to the effects.

Most of us, faced with this, have thought we saw a loophole. "Yes; this is so for dead matter, but not for sentient beings. Life makes the difference." Does it?

I go to church because I feel it my duty. I feel it my duty because I was brought up to feel that. I was so brought up because I had that kind of parents. Even in conduct we assume a sufficient cause for every effect. But a sufficient cause *prescribes* its effect, and between the two what becomes of the impression of choice?

That is the logic of determinism. It is some comfort, though not much, that no one flounders in his logic so badly as your determinist does.

Examine carefully the following remark made in an interview by Professor Einstein. It looks all right at first: "I believe with Schopenhauer, 'We can do what we wish, but we can only wish what we must.' Practically I am, nevertheless, compelled to act as though freedom of the will existed." You have to read it once or twice before you notice how out of place is that "nevertheless." As who should say, "I am under compulsion all the time, *nevertheless* in one particular respect I am under compulsion." You would expect "and so," or "accordingly," or "for instance." Why the unexpected suggestion of an exception where he is adducing an example?

Because he has slipped in spite of himself into using the word "compelled" in the sense of a moral obligation or an æsthetic preference. But this is no language for a determinist. Yet you will find all determinists involved in it. They cannot prove their case without energy; they cannot use energy without the exertion of will; they cannot exert will without disproving their case.

Still, determinism remains attractive for all who want a neat Universe, and the Relativity theory in one aspect tends greatly to strengthen this scientific fatalism. For it seems to present us with a block Universe; and nothing could be neater than that.

You and I speak of a "course of events" where Einstein might prefer to speak of a *chunk* of events, you being a lesser chunk embedded in the whole chunk. It is true that a queer little thing is skipping along this chunk, called the Present Moment, but it is relative like other things. Your Now may not be my Now. Besides, a spot of light running along a penholder would not greatly disturb my examination of the penholder. It would not *create* the penholder as it went along. Why should I imagine that a spot of Now running along the time-dimension creates the events as it reaches them? Is it not more reasonable to suppose it simply brings them to light?

Personally, I feel that the elusive moment called Now will prove to have more importance than the scheme of Relativity-physics has yet been inclined to give it. Those who wish to disport themselves in these deep waters may be recommended to read Bergson, J. S. Dunne, and Sir Arthur Eddington, who all in different ways encourage us to look on the future as the scene of real contingencies, and not mere actualities.

Turning from Relativity to Quantum Theory, we happen immediately on something rather sensational. Apparently an unexpected claimant to independence has not only turned up, but proved his case—the particle. I gather from Eddington, without in the least understanding it, that the position is this: You have a particle faced with several alternatives as to what it shall do next. Which will it do?

It is uncertain *in the nature of things* which it will do. It does its one thing, and when you ask, "What caused it to do this rather than the others?" science replies point-blank, "Nothing caused it." The old argument about sufficient causes breaks down at the first word. To-day's causes are not sufficient (in the case of a particle) for to-morrow's effects. The atom is not greatly bothered by this capriciousness on the part of the vibrations within it, any more than a suburban railway company is bothered by the question whether Mr. Smith will travel by the 8.20 to-day or not. If he does not, somebody else will. If you are dealing with big numbers, it is safe to bank on the law of averages. But it is something new to our thought to learn that Nature is banking on the law of averages.

And if a particle can do what it likes, surely I can!

This argument has been a long one. I will compress my final point.

We can well understand the reaction promoted by these ideas in the direction of Idealism, the view that the stuff in the

background of existence may after all be Mind-stuff. No doubt great difficulties in thought must be surmounted before this view is generally accepted, but the tide sets that way.

So-called "dead-matter" has been hunted down remorselessly until it has turned to bay and vanished in two directions at once. For a scientist to get to grips with a brick seems as disappointing as for you and me to get to grips with a rainbow. Physics has been saying all through, we must not be misled by mere mental impressions, we must get in touch with the real solid thing. But more and more the suspicion dawns and grows that the real solid thing may be a mental impression. If you don't like Ideas, what are you doing playing about with Equations, which seem all that are left to you? They do not look much more solid than Ideas. The old charge against theology, that it was out of touch with real life, would be reiterated with tenfold force against a physical science which was content to give us a Universe which no one would recognize.

It may be that the return from the shadow-world disclosed by modern physics up to the warm actual world of experience can be made by means of the Idealistic view. Believe that true thoughts are real things and you begin your return journey at once. You accept the atom, for instance, not *in spite of* its being an imaginary boundary, but *because* it is imaginary and because this mental image is a true one (*i.e.*, corresponds with the image in the supreme Mind). And so on all the way up, until you get to the highest reality (or image) known to our outward experience, spiritual man—the stepping-off place whence we ascend in thought to the Reality of realities, God. But you must pay your fare back. Throughout the process you must accept the supreme Mind, to escape the nightmare of thinking that there are as many Universes as there are lesser minds, or the alternative nightmare of thinking that yours is the only mind and the Universe is its product.

In some such way perhaps modern scientific outlook will be linked up again and reconciled not merely with religion but with that sturdy something in all of us which maintains that meat and drink and sport and our next-door neighbour are what we take them to be, and are more than algebraic masses of space-time. At all events, the tendency is there, and it may enable the scientist of to-morrow to say with us, what might have been difficult for the scientist of yesterday, the ancient lines which contain our ultimate faith:

O Strength and Stay, upholding all Creation,
Who ever dost Thyself unmoved abide,
Yet day by day the light in due gradation
From hour to hour through all its changes guide.

E. C. MORTIMER.

A POPISH CONVERT OF THE REIGN OF GEORGE I.

THE century which divided the Popish plot from the Gordon riots is generally admitted by Roman Catholic historians to have marked the nadir of the fortunes of their communion in England. The political conditions of the whole of the eighteenth century, no less than its intellectual temper, were hostile to the persons and principles of papists. At the outset the policy of James II. proved more dangerous to his friends than to his enemies, whilst the uncertain prospects of the Protestant succession, even after the establishment of the Revolution settlement, maintained a panic fear of papist intrigues to restore the Stuart line at the cost of destroying the civil and religious liberties of the nation. The tradition of fearful suspicion thus created was perpetuated by the initial unpopularity of the Hanoverian dynasty and by the Jacobite rebellions of 1715 and 1745, so that even the lapse of a generation and the experience of eighteen years' unchallenged rule by George III. had not allayed popular apprehension. In 1779 the Relief Act in favour of papists, proposed by Savile and carried through Parliament, provoked the fanaticism of the Gordon riots in 1780.

Many examples could be adduced of the hardship and difficulty endured by papists during the whole of this period. The fact that actual persecution was rare and intermittent did little to remove the sense of insecurity and precariousness which circumscribed their activities. In particular the maintenance of their religious tradition was achieved only by conditions of extreme caution and secrecy. The life of a Roman priest was one of continuous concealment, "disguised as a layman, living obscurely, gathering the faithful around him for a hidden mass, for surreptitious instruction or for the administration of the sacraments."* Papal bishops and vicars apostolic cultivated a similar secrecy in their movements; ordinations, consecrations, and confirmations conducted on English soil were guarded by most stringent precautions of privacy; and the ordinary religious services for the laity were celebrated often in obscure taverns with small congregations, lest the resort of a large number of persons should arouse suspicion. The admission of the faithful to these meetings by repetition of a password, the hasty exchange by the clergy of their outdoor lay garb for the sacerdotal vestments of their office, and the record of Bishop Challoner's

* E. H. Burton: *Life and Times of Bishop Challoner*, i., p. 69.

preaching in The Ship Inn, in Whetston Park near Lincoln's Inn Fields to a company of which each member was "sitting with a pot of beer before him so as to afford a pretext for the gathering in case of interruption," were incidents illustrative of the prevalent atmosphere of terror. In such circumstances the temptations to apostacy were pressing. For the laity, whose lives might be subjected to a multitude of legal disabilities, a silent defection offered an easy way of escape and involved little public notoriety. But the penalties which might be invoked upon the heads of clergy created almost equal difficulties for those who remained constant and for those who apostatized. The obstacles in the way of such individuals as a result of the severe secrecy imposed upon laity and priests alike are illustrated by the following episode of a Roman priest who transferred his allegiance to the Established Church in England during the reign of the first Hanoverian sovereign.

On May 21, 1720, Bishop Edward Chandler of Coventry and Lichfield consulted Archbishop Wake concerning the position of Thomas Mainwaring, who had migrated from Norton near Ashby-de-la-Zouch to settle as a curate in his diocese, and upon being required to present his Letters of Orders, replied that "he had been bred a papist and was ordained a priest at Rome several years ago." The sole evidence produced in support of this claim was "a certificate under the hand and seal of Cardinal Carpigni, that on Saturday the 20 December 1710 one Thomas Spencer of London, scholar in the English college, was ordained presbyter, by Seigneur Zanolis, archbishop of Theodosia, his suffragan, in the Lateran church." Mainwaring asserted that he was the person referred to in the document, alleging that "no Englishman was made priest under his own name, because of the penal laws against such," and stating that he had served curacies in the dioceses of Norwich and Lincoln, and was known to the archbishop. Chandler therefore referred the problem to the primate, expressing his anxiety on account of "the great room there was for the fraud of hiring or stealing Letters of Orders and of personating others therewith," and urging that "such persons upon the single credit of those certificates, that don't appear to concern them, ought not to be admitted to officiate in the Church of England; or if they be, a great gap was opened to much confusion." In regard to the particular case he added the caution that proselytes should only be received if they "well understood both religions, which he did not discover in this person from the small time he had to converse with him."*

* Bishop Chandler to Archbishop Wake, May 21, 1720, Wake MSS., Epist. 21. Item ccxxiv., f. 322.

Apart from the individual merits of Mainwaring, his condition raised general questions of considerable difficulty, as to the means of verifying the credentials of Roman priests possessed only of a pseudonymous certificate. Mainwaring offered as proof of his sincerity the suggestion that Chandler should "be left at liberty to reordain him, if what he had hitherto done were not satisfactory, *sub conditione*," whilst insisting on the veracity of his statement.* But in the face of the bishop's demand for proof that he was the person to whom the cardinal's statement referred, he confessed that he could offer only indirect testimony, and that of a kind difficult to substantiate. He averred that he had acted in his sacerdotal capacity in the houses of country gentlemen in the neighbourhood of the bishop's residence at Eccleshall, whose names he gave, and argued that, if his story were untrue, they "would for their own sakes, and to take off the imputation, for such they thought it to be, immediately expose him." Failing such repudiation, the circumstance was in his favour; but as for direct proof, that was impossible. "Your grace too well knows the penalties to which Romish priests are liable if proved to be such," he wrote to Wake, "as not to believe they would take all the prudent precaution possible to prevent their being discovered. Now should Orders in their own name be produced against them, it might endanger their lives. The method then in use is that if persons do take out letters of Orders, who have been ordained at Rome, Paris, or elsewhere by letters dimissorial, it is in the same name by which they went at college where no one goes by his own name." To illustrate this point he mentioned the assumed names of various noted persons, including Du Puis and Dr. Gyfford, at present a titular bishop residing in England, who had gone by the name of Fowler, as he himself had been known by that of Spencer; and he affirmed that this was "a specimen after what manner the foreign seminaries proceeded in order to prevent their falling under the cognizance of those laws which were in force against them." For confirmation of his evidence he appealed to the experience of Mr. Aspinwall, the sub-dean of the king's chapels.†

The appeal to Mr. Aspinwall, though not producing the corroboration desired by Mainwaring, adduced a further item of interesting information about Roman customs. On June 18, 1720, Bishop Chandler reported to Wake the result of an indirect enquiry of the sub-dean, who said that "he never heard of Orders being given in a feigned name," but added that "he certified his own Orders by shewing a thesis in theology, wherein he

* Mr. T. Mainwaring to Archbishop Wake, June 27, *ibid.*, ccxxv., f. 324.

† Mainwaring to Wake, June 8, *ibid.*, ccxxvii., f. 326.

styled himself *pater*, which they were not allowed to do till in Orders, and by producing two or three officers who saw him officiate abroad." With regard to the other statements of Mainwaring, his lordship accepted his assurance that he had acted as a priest in the house of a gentleman in the parish of Eccleshall, though unfortunately the man "was yet too bigoted or timorous to testify it"; but he demurred to the conferment of Orders by himself "in the hypothetical manner," because, though the Church of England had "such a rubric for doubtful baptism, he knew not whether he could be excused for giving Orders in that form without his grace's express direction." If that command were given there remained the difficulty whether he should take the suppliant's word as sufficient evidence that he was deacon; "for his certificate of taking that Order was delivered to the bishop that made him priest, as he said the custom was in the Roman church."* In order to advance the matter a stage further the bishop sent his secretary to the house of one Mr. Fleetwood, whose name had been quoted as a papist, and who stated "that he was as certain Mr. Mainwaring was in Romish Orders as he could be of any man's whom he did not see ordained," whereupon Chandler enquired whether the primate considered this "sufficient ground to license him if better proofs failed."† More specific information could not be secured from Mr. Fleetwood, since "he knew too well the penalties the Roman Catholics lay under," and therefore would not testify, as Mainwaring asserted that he could have done, that he had both "heard and seen him say mass, and assisting Bishop Witham as deacon at a confirmation in his house." To supply the defect in this testimony Mainwaring declared to Wake that there were many persons in London who "had seen him celebrate the Mysteries, who had been at confession with him, and whom he had baptized," giving the names of one gentleman in whose house he had served as chaplain for two years, and of others with whom he had lodged. In reply to the disconcerting testimony of Aspinwall he affirmed that, though "in Paris Dr. Witham, the president of the English seminary," and others knew him by his true name, yet "at the college of Notre Dame du Virtus he went by the name of Spencer and all others who were English changed their names."‡ At length the primate after private enquiry declared himself satisfied, communicated his decision to the Bishop of Coventry and Lichfield, and the incident closed with the grateful thanks of Mainwaring, who had "subscribed to the form of declaration which his lordship

* Chandler to Wake, June 18, *ibid.*, ccxxvi., f. 325.

† Chandler to Wake, July 16, *ibid.*, ccxxix., f. 330.

‡ Mainwaring to Wake, July 4, *ibid.*, ccxxviii., f. 328.

thought proper," and received from Chandler the promise of his licence.*

Further investigation of the episode is precluded by the unfortunate circumstance that at Lichfield neither Register nor Act Book of Chandler survives, whilst the surviving Subscription Book contains no record of the name or case of Mainwaring. It is not possible to ascertain the precise form of declaration prescribed nor the conditions of licence. But the incident itself is not without interest or importance. From the Roman standpoint it illustrates the difficulties of the position of papists, whilst from the Anglican it added another to the many harassing problems of episcopal administration. Already the methods of oversight were inadequate to secure the regular inspection of Letters of Orders and testimonials in order to prevent occasions of fraud, and to control the migratory clergy who wandered at intervals from diocese to diocese; whilst the difficulty of proof might well cause bishops to be cautious in admitting proselytes to officiate in the ministry upon the testimony of an uncertain and pseudonymous certificate.

NORMAN SYKES.

IN PRAISE OF BEAUTY

"It is loveliness I seek, not lovely things."—FIONA MACLEOD.

THE year 1929 was remarkable for a great outburst of public feeling against the rapid destruction, by means with which we are all only too familiar, of the natural beauties of our country. Only a national crisis can unite, even temporarily, rival political parties, and the joint letter issued by the three party leaders before the opening of the General Election campaign showed that the matter was regarded as nothing less than one of National Defence—the enemy being not foreign aggression but foes of our own household. The movement which is still, happily, gaining ground, and has (at the time of writing) secured the second reading of a Parliamentary Bill, has been so far extremely characteristic of our English way of dealing with a crisis, which is to act first and think afterwards. In other words, we trust our instincts rather than waste valuable time in reasoning. In this case the objective was clear and the methods adopted were excellent, but no underlying principle has been formulated and no attempt has been made to expound the philosophy—if such is supposed to exist—of the matter. The Dean

* Mainwaring to Wake, October 8, *ibid.*, ccxxx., f. 331.

of Manchester in a weighty letter to *The Times* did indeed point out that in order to stem the tide of destruction it was necessary to discover its source, and suggested that this was to be found in the ugliness of our industrial districts, which bred a people with so little use for beauty that they destroyed it at sight; but he did not analyze the matter further.

On the whole, the general feeling about the beauty of the country is expressed by the phrase "national assets," and the question suggests itself whether Beauty can be rightly described in terms of economics. It has value, of course, but what kind of value? Our attitude towards Beauty, in practice as well as in theory, depends ultimately, and in many cases directly, on the answer to this question.

It is told of Sir Edward Burne-Jones that when he was painting his great Epiphany picture, "The Star of Bethlehem," he was asked by a visitor to his studio whether he believed that the story of the Magi was true, to which he replied, "It is too beautiful not to be true."* A similar argument is put by George MacDonald† into the mouth of little Diamond, when a playmate says that a certain piece of news is too good to be true. "It can't be," protests Diamond. "Isn't *true* good? and isn't *good* good? how can anything be too good to be true?"

Such ideas are naturally abhorrent to town-planning committees, who promptly dismiss them as metaphysical nonsense. They are, indeed, sound philosophy, and if with the poets, philosophers, and mystics, we accept the existence of Beauty, Truth, and Goodness as Absolute Values, we are lifted at once out of the sphere of utilitarianism. Beauty then is seen to belong to the transcendental order. It exists in and through God, who is Perfect Beauty, and whose Beauty is the source of all being. "Ex divina pulchritudinæ esse omnium derivatur," says St. Thomas. St. John sums up his life-long meditation upon the Divine Nature in the phrase "God is Light," on which Dr. Gore comments, (this) "is to say that He is ungrudging goodness and glorious beauty and pure truth."

But to St. John the phrase is more than a statement; it is a message. The Church exists to proclaim God to the world, and must therefore proclaim His Being and His Attributes. Beauty, Truth, and Goodness are more than philosophic terms, they are essentials of the Divine Nature.

How far has the Church really taught this? History shows that where the human element comes in, teaching is seldom accurately balanced, one aspect being emphasized at the expense

* Maritain, in *Art et Scholastique*, allies beauty with goodness rather than with truth.

† *At the Back of the North Wind*.

of another, not necessarily of set purpose, but by force of circumstances. It would seem that in the age of the Great Councils the emphasis was mainly on Truth, in later mediæval times on Beauty, and in the post-Reformation period on Goodness. During the last two centuries certainly the moral side of religion has been stressed to the partial neglect of Truth and the almost total neglect of Beauty.

It is with the last that this paper is concerned. We are reaping the reward of this neglect, not only in the ugliness of manufacturing districts and the ruin of the countryside, but in the increasing vulgarization and secularizing of life in general. There have, of course, been recurrent periods of advance and decline in æsthetics as well as in morals, but probably at no time has so large a part of the civilized world been so completely dominated by materialism—a materialism which does not trouble to deny the existence of God, but simply ignores Him. As a man who persists in wilful sin gradually loses his capacity for belief in God, so it is with neglect of that other aspect of the Divine which is Beauty. The conflict between Science and Religion is not ended, it has merely shifted its ground. From being a matter of intellectual argument it has now become mainly psychological, and the influence of the scientific spirit in education, and indeed in modern life generally, is to repress and starve the æsthetic instincts and cravings, with disastrous results.*

Those who call themselves not only Christians but Catholics must face the question whether they believe that Beauty as an Absolute Value is a fundamental part of religion and to be taught as such. The Tractarians did so believe. The Editor of *THEOLOGY*, in his address to the Cheltenham Church Congress in 1928, pointed out that the Oxford Movement "awakened a sensitiveness to beauty which restored our churches and transformed our worship, not from any subjective taste or æsthetic impulse, but from a fundamental belief that God was a God of beauty and His nature belied unless this were proclaimed." But (as the same speaker mentioned in another connection) the successors of the Tractarians were practical parish priests rather than thinkers, and were driven by force of circumstances to concentrate on what "worked," so that the underlying principles tended to be lost sight of, and "beauty in religion" came to mean simply the employment of art, music, and ceremonial as accessories to corporate worship, a conception which is obviously far too narrow.

Within these limits things have certainly improved since

* Cf. Archbishop Temple's essay, "The Faith of the Twentieth Century," in *The Future of the Church of England*.

the early days of the Catholic revival. Modern stained glass has little in common with the atrocities set up in the middle of last century; church furnishers no longer exhibit sanctuary carpets of crimson felt besprinkled with dingy black fleur-de-lis, and the number of churches is rapidly diminishing in which Gounod's "Messe Solennelle" (complete with band) is regarded as the crowning glory of musical expression in the worship of God. Hope for the future is encouraged by the formation of guilds of craftsmen and artists, and the finely conceived venture of the School of English Church Music.

But such enterprises, besides covering only a very small field, cannot in themselves do more than improve public taste, and their influence may be only transient, since the public is fickle, and fashion both arbitrary and tyrannical. The world's standards are earthly and therefore temporary, having no objective value. We need other-worldly standards, values which are real and eternal. And herein is our weakness, that we do not believe in Beauty as we believe in Truth and Goodness, and have allowed the sensualist to pervert it and the Puritan and the materialist (strange comrades in arms!) to destroy it, without making any effective protest. The Church has to oppose what is ugly, as well as what is immoral or false, and is powerless without the weapon of strong and reasoned convictions. There is more driving force behind Archbishop Benson's assertion that the idle switching off of spring-time buds is a breach of the Third Commandment, than behind Kant's opinion that the destruction of natural beauty is a crime against man but not a crime in any other sense.* At present, however, the Archbishop would be in a very small minority if public opinion were canvassed.

If anyone doubts the general lack of conviction of the reality of Beauty and its place as an essential of religion, let him consider three everyday instances:

1. The absurd and unfair treatment accorded by the accredited ministers of the Church to those lay people who, being themselves believers in Beauty, venture to expound their philosophy and appeal for its acceptance. This is sometimes a positively dangerous thing to attempt, especially if it involves any reference to local conditions; but, assuming that it can be done safely, are such observations ever taken as a serious contribution to Church life or religion in general? They are not. They are invariably regarded, most unjustly, as a mere fad or idle criticism based on nothing more than personal likes and dislikes, and at best are dismissed with a tolerant smile and rejoinders such as these: "I'm afraid I know nothing about Art." "We

* Quoted in Laird's *The Idea of Value*.

have to cater for the majority, not for musical people like you." "Oh, well, you see, my people like it." The inadequacy of these replies is apparent if they are translated into terms of morality. A priest who wished to poke fun at his interlocutor might assert that he did not preach charity because his parishioners liked quarrelling, but he would not expect to be believed.*

There are other rejoinders painfully familiar to the champions of Beauty—e.g., "Don't shoot the organist, he is doing his best" (which really has something in it, for the legitimate target is often not the organist but the Vicar, Church Council, and congregation, who are accessories both before and after the fact); and the solemn reminder that "Worship must cost us something," an argument which when used in this connection is surely the most shocking perversion ever made of a real spiritual truth.

One result of this treatment of serious convictions is that the congregation in the average church rarely includes artists and musicians unless they are people of heroic mould, and eventually the Church may lose them altogether, because they cease to have any use for a religion which apparently treats as negligible what they regard as fundamental.

2. The negative attitude of the Church, or rather of our churches, to the beauty of Nature. Some twenty years ago Canon C. H. Robinson quoted the saying of a Central African Bishop, "When a man begins to appreciate scenery, it shows that our efforts to teach are beginning to take effect," and made it the basis of a suggestive essay on the power of Christianity to develop the appreciation of natural beauty.† In this respect the Catholic movement has done surprisingly little, considering that Catholicism stands emphatically for Sacramentalism and that every Catholic thinker holds that Nature is essentially Sacramental.‡ Catholicism to-day makes use of Art, both good and bad, but seems on the whole to regard Nature as outside its province. Partly, no doubt, this is because our most zealous priests—all honour to them—have chosen to work in the slums of our great cities where the beauties of creation simply do not exist. Perhaps also the very intensity of belief in the Sacraments of the Church has tended to obscure the Sacrament of Nature. It is possible to concentrate so exclusively on the Divine Presence on the Altar as to lose sight of the Presence elsewhere, and to insist so strenuously on the duty of Eucharistic worship as to forget that the Catholic

* Cf. Archbishop Temple: "I am told that people love singing the hymn 'Hark, hark, my soul' to Henry Smart's tune. I can only reply that the more they love it the more harm it will do them." *Op. cit.*

† Reprinted in *The Interpretation of the Character of Christ*.

‡ Cf. esp. Illingworth, *Divine Immanence*.

should worship "at all times and in all places," and therefore, not least when the glory of the Lord is revealed in earth and sky and sea. It might be expected that in the country both aspects would be taught and understood, and that the ever-visible beauty of Creation would be an added reason for every country church having its daily Eucharist (cf. *E.H.*, 309); but this is very far from being the case, and souls whose joy in natural beauty would find its fullest expression in Sacramental worship and communion are all too often sent empty away. Many of our old village churches do in themselves inspire worship, being wholly worthy of their beautiful surroundings—notably those in the west country (and such as "Crossways," that shrine of Easter peace described by Mrs. Skrine in unforgettable language); but the church which drove Martin Challoner to Rome, mainly through the glaring contrast between its cheap hideousness and the loveliness of the world outside, has many counterparts in real life, and one peculiarity of these buildings is that worshippers are not allowed to see out of doors. If funds do not run to stained glass throughout, the less important windows must be filled with opaque squares of pink and sea-green; anything rather than the indecency of clear glass through which trees and clouds would be visible. To such an extent have we carried the separation of Nature from "religion" that every Lent, when spring with its mingled snow and sunshine calls loudly even in towns, choirmasters produce settings of the *Benedicite* ingeniously shortened in order to avoid boring the congregation, and at no season is it ever expected or suggested that holidays might conceivably increase our knowledge and love of God. Yet we profess belief in the Holy Spirit, *Dominum et vivificantem*, to whom is attributed both the beauty of Nature and the faculty by which we appreciate it. If the Altar recalls Christmas, Nature should recall one aspect at least of Whitsuntide. This is in no sense Pantheism. "The true order of going is to use the beauties of Earth as steps along which one mounts upwards for the sake of that other Beauty."*

3. A third instance, albeit perhaps a minor one, is the general attitude towards the Bible. It is regarded as a means of grace in so far as it teaches Truth and Goodness. Beauty *qua* beauty does not count. (The occasional references to "the literary value of the Bible" do not touch the real question at all.) Hence we have the phenomenon of a sermon or meditation which tries to find a moral lesson in such a passage as Isaiah xxxv., instead of using it as a door leading straight to the contemplation of Uncreated Beauty.

* Plato, *Symposium*.

A great deal of what we have deplored in the foregoing paragraphs is simply the legacy of Puritanism; and its result is, by a strange irony of fate, the very opposite of what Puritanism aimed at producing.

It may be contended, as against the argument of this paper, (a) that the appreciation of Beauty is largely a matter of technical training and therefore beyond the reach of the majority; (b) that whereas through the Incarnation we possess an absolute standard of moral perfection, *i.e.* of Goodness, we possess no such standard of Beauty, and therefore the quest of it is either unnecessary or futile, and in no sense a duty.

These arguments, in content if not in form, are dealt with in chapter ii. of *Christus Veritas* (Temple), *q.v.*, but it may be noted here, as regards (a) that, in the first place, Beauty and Art are not identical, and it does not follow that because the true greatness of a Beethoven Symphony can only be fully grasped by a trained musician, therefore only an expert in art can appreciate the blue haze of wild hyacinths in spring. "Training" of a kind is necessary, but not the kind usually known as technical. In the second place, if Beauty is an attribute of God, we may expect man to possess some capacity, latent at any rate, for apprehending it. The mystical doctrine of the Divine spark at the apex of the soul, if true at all, must apply to every kind of approach to, or apprehension of, God. As regards (b), it is true that Goodness can only be manifested in a Person, but it is not so with Beauty. The manifestation of Beauty in Nature is entirely real, and has often been unfairly discounted because it could not be classed as "revealed religion." If the heavens do not, to many people, declare the glory and the beauty of God, the fault lies in the people and not in the absence of Divine manifestation. The Christian Fathers had no doubts about it. "The wider our contemplation of creation, the grander is our conception of God" (St. Cyril). "Who can look on Nature and not see God?" (St. Hilary). "The visible world is the garment and drapery of God" (Gregory of Nyssa; *cf.* Hugh Benson's story, *The Green Robe*). Such quotations can of course be multiplied *ad infinitum*, since religious literature from the Psalms to Francis Thompson is full of the same thought. It has been suggested that just as every race has a contribution to make to the full interpretation of the Christian faith, so every department of Nature has something to contribute, and that the full significance of the Divine revelation in Christ will only be grasped when God's revelation of Himself in Nature is perfectly understood.*

Until we recover the belief in Beauty as divine the Church

* Dr. C. H. Robinson.

will continue to fight the forces of materialism with one hand tied. We have had, and have, prophets proclaiming Truth and Goodness; but where, in the Church, are the prophets of Beauty? If they exist, do they cry aloud in the wilderness of unbelief?

In a materialistic age it is well to be thrown back upon spiritual experience, and perhaps for many the ultimate justification for belief in the eternal reality of Beauty is found in the homesickness for the infinite of which Pascal speaks.* We are strangers and pilgrims, and at times we catch glimpses of our own country—glimpses which, seen through the medium of earthly beauty, bring a sense of remoteness and unattainableness and sometimes an almost intolerable pain. But he who can discern in the splendour of art and music, in the elusive beauty of the wild creatures of hill and wood, or in the magic of a northern sunset, the Mystery of God—such a man knows that this pain of unsatisfied longing must be the lot of every true pilgrim. There is no royal road to Beauty, save the Royal Way of the Holy Cross.

“And we too desire, not a fair one but the fairest of all. Unless we find him we shall think we have failed.” It is no casual beauty that will content us; what we are seeking after is that supreme beauty which must of necessity be unique.

E. M. BULLOCK.

RELIGION AND POLITICS IN ALSACE

THE relations of Church and State in the France of which Alsace had been a part until 1870 were governed by the Concordat imposed upon Pius VI. by Napoleon in 1801. This placed the duty of appointing bishops in the hands of the Government, which was also bound to provide for the salaries of priests, pastors, and rabbis and to see that religious instruction was given in the schools.

The transference of Alsace from French to German rule made no change in these relations. The German Government accepted the conditions of the Concordat, which continues in Alsace to this day. But the German connection naturally affected the development of the different confessions in Alsace. Three-quarters of the population were Catholics. German immigration largely increased the number of Protestants. But annexation to a Germany in which Prussia was dominant did not result in the submission of Alsatian Protestants to the

* Cf. THEOLOGY, June, 1929, Editorial.

domination of the Lutheran Church of Prussia. "The Alsatian Church of the Augsburg Confession was able to maintain its own traditions of Bucerian origin." Nor did the annexation result in a diminution of the power of Catholicism in the conquered provinces; on the contrary, it strengthened the hold of that form of religion as well as the importance of Lutheranism. This does not mean that the numbers of the Alsatian Catholics were increased by conversions, but that a different conception of the functions of Catholicism magnified the influence of its priests and their power over the people.

The borderland between France and Germany is also the borderland between two different notions of the place of religion in life: between the western notion, which lays emphasis on the individual, and the eastern, which stresses the group or the corporation. The Anglo-Saxon countries are the stronghold of the western conception; but when French Catholicism is compared with the Catholicism of Germany and of Austria, it is clear that its place is with the western group. Napoleon's Concordat secured the material independence of the priesthood, but it was not intended to encourage their political activity, though it did not prevent it. The part played by French Catholics in the politics of the latter half of the nineteenth century led to their undoing and to the completion of that Revolutionary policy which Napoleon had seemed to reverse. The manner in which the Separation of the Church from the State was accomplished, at a time when controversy was at its climax, inflicted many hardships, but the result was a purification which few French Catholics to-day regret. The loss of material privileges was far outweighed by the gain of spiritual force, and the new generation of priests has earned a respect and affection more sincere than any accorded to its predecessors.

While the western (individualist) spirit was thus being consecrated in France, the opposite (German) conception was permeating Alsace. Its influence had been felt already before 1870, for the geographical position of the diocese of Strasbourg as well as the language of the people rendered it peculiarly susceptible to German ideas. A certain predisposition then, the *Kulturkampf*, the growth of Socialism, and the appointment of Germans to the bishoprics of Strasbourg (1890) and of Metz (1899), all facilitated the co-operation of Alsatian and German Catholics. Each sought the aid of the other; the Catholics in Alsace entered into relations with the Centre, the powerfully equipped party of German Catholics, and organized themselves on its model. The interests of religion, as they conceived them, took the place of the interests of the "patrie"; or rather the Church became the substitute for a "patrie" they no longer possessed.

The anxiety of the Centre to win political power led it to aim at control in all departments of life, and the priests were its most active agents. When that power had been won and the position of the Centre as one of the great political parties of Germany was established, the Imperial Government did much to encourage it in Alsace, for they recognized it as a powerful Germanizing influence. In 1903 a faculty of Catholic Theology was created in the University of Strasbourg. Its German education left an indelible stamp on the younger priesthood of Alsace; among the professors was Martain Spahn, son of the leader of the Centre party, and one of his pupils, M. Keppi, is a leading autonomist to-day.

The emigration to France after 1870 had in itself contributed to increase the influence of the Alsatian clergy. They were the one class of people who remained at their posts, and their authority was enhanced by the departure of so many of the upper and educated classes. This emigration, too, made easier the extension of the power of the Centre Party. During the last thirty years of the nineteenth century life in Alsace was organized as never before, and there were few branches of the new organizations over which the *curé* had no control. The Alsatian Centre had a powerful press. The priest was always President or Treasurer of the Raiffeisen savings banks which were established all over the countryside; and the knowledge of his parishioners' incomes sealed his supremacy.

Although the Centre Party was a new phenomenon in German history it was but the organized expression of the general view of religion in Germany, not only among the Catholics, but, still more markedly, among the Lutherans. It was a view for which Napoleon's Concordat admirably provided, a view which regarded the priest as the paid servant of the State. M. Vermeil has analyzed it most acutely in an article in the *Revue des Vivants* (August, 1928). After describing the notion of a "salaried despotism, of masses conducted by chiefs," which was part of the legacy of the German régime in Alsace, he showed how far the Lutherans carried this idea: "Far from separating the temporal from the spiritual, German Lutheranism claimed to surpass mediæval Catholicism on this very point and to Christianize civilization and culture still better."

It was natural, then, that the Separation of Church from State in France should be viewed with dismay in Alsace. To those Catholics who were influenced by German Catholicism, while they retained their French sympathies, it seemed a disaster; and the Germans were quick to profit by the unfortunate impression. They worked assiduously to discredit the country which could permit such a sacrifice of religious interests. The

impiety, immorality, and degeneracy of the French were the favourite themes of preachers and teachers, and the odious spectre of Voltaire was invoked to chill the Gallic sympathies of Alsatian Catholics and Lutherans alike. The mentality produced by German training was genuinely unable to appreciate the benefits of the Separation. The most hideous tales were circulated, which showed that the act of 1905 was both misrepresented and misunderstood. The innocent people had no means of verifying their truth, even when they did not implicitly believe whatever was told them by priests often as ignorant as themselves. And so, long after the war was over and Alsace had become French again, Alsations were still to be found who believed that "*à l'intérieur*" Catholics were persecuted and all the churches were closed.

Thus the Separation of Church from State in France made a wide gulf between French and German Catholicism, and, unfortunately both for France and for Alsace, Alsace stood on the German side. The French pre-war propaganda and the war itself, with its revelation of the barrenness and brutality of Germanism, were insufficient to bridge the dividing space. Alsatian and French Catholics were now united in one State and under one Government, but they were still separated by a fundamental difference of outlook. And the Alsatian Catholics had the master-hand: they represented three-quarters of the population; they were well disciplined and powerfully organized. It would scarcely be an exaggeration to say that Alsace is one of the most "practising" of Catholic countries in Europe. No Government could afford to alienate its Catholic population by refusing to recognize the privileges to which it had been accustomed. The principle of the uniformity and universality of Republican legislation in France had to be sacrificed to the need of securing the affections of the recovered provinces, and the Concordat of 1801, which had been respected by the Germans, was continued by the Government of the French Republic.

The old Alsatian Centre Party was reorganized to suit the needs of the new situation and reappeared as the "*Union Populaire Républicaine Nationale d'Alsace*," or more shortly the U.P.R. It was allied to the Bloc National in the legislative elections of 1919 and of 1924, and until the latter year all went smoothly. But in 1924 the Radical Socialist Party, and not the Bloc National, was returned to power; and "*laïcisme*" was one of the cardinal points of its programme. The new *Président du Conseil*, M. Herriot, had the best intentions; he had to face complicated problems both at home and abroad, and nothing was further from his wishes than to add another by creating difficulties in Alsace. But he was ill

informed about the strength of religious feeling there; his chief advisers were anti-clericals to whom the Concordat seemed a loathsome anachronism; and he was bound to propitiate his supporters by an endorsement of their principal ideas. "The Government," he announced in his declaration of policy, "is convinced that it faithfully interprets the will of its dear peoples finally restored to France, in hastening the advent of the day when the last legislative difference will be effaced between the recovered departments and the whole of the territory of the Republic. To this end it will abolish the general commissariat and will permit the introduction into Alsace and Lorraine of the whole of the republican legislation." There was no direct reference to the Concordat, but the implications of the words "the whole of the republican legislation," especially when those words were pronounced by the head of a Radical-Socialist ministry, were unmistakable. They raised a storm in the Alsace and provoked the hostility of the very people it was most important to conciliate.

The traditional hostility of Protestants and Catholics had long survived; but the régime of the Concordat applied to both and benefited both, and this did much to bring them together when that régime seemed imperilled. There was no unanimous opinion as to the attitude to be adopted by the Protestants to M. Herriot's declaration. The Église Réformée, which had always been influenced by western, and especially French, religious thought, was prepared to accept Separation from the State. But it was a much less important body numerically than the Lutheran Church in Alsace, and the Lutherans with their stronger Germanic tradition were disposed to opposition. Yet, even among those pastors who preserved most tenaciously the ideas of "fonctionnairisme," there was a division of opinion which corresponded to a division of interests. Those who were more exclusively concerned with the moral and social welfare of their parishioners more readily fraternized with their brethren of the Reformed Church and were not intransigently opposed to French ideas. Those who were more attracted by questions of doctrine and by the historical development of Lutheranism attached greater importance to the maintenance of German traditions and connections and were consequently more suspicious of French intentions and hostile to French ideas. The official attitude was cautious; at first "on n'approuva ni ne désapprouva"; then the authorities mildly indicated their preference for the *status quo* because of its educational advantages. Nevertheless the Churches prepared to meet the exigencies of a Separation, should it arise, and the Consistory of the Augsburg Confession created at Strasbourg a special fund to supply the

needs of its clergy, should they suddenly be deprived of State aid. But the caution of the Lutheran authorities was in contrast to the attitude of the Lutheran press, which indulged in vigorous denunciation of the Herriot policy, and certainly aroused the indignation of a large section of its readers. Thus the Radical-Socialist Government succeeded in stirring up the opposition of a considerable portion of the Protestant quarter, as well as of the whole of the Catholic three-quarters, of the population.

The loss of salary which would result from a separation of the Church from the State is a very common but very inadequate explanation of the hostility of the Alsatian clergy. It would be inhuman to suppose that this motive has had no weight, but it would be unjust to suppose that it alone weighed more than all others. The implied threat to abolish the Concordat was not merely a repudiation of the promises made by Joffre and others that the religious and cultural rights of the Alsatians should be strictly respected; it was a blow at the structure of the Germanic type of Christianity which had established itself so firmly since 1870. In that structure the union of State and Church and the official status of the priest are fundamental. An irreligious or neutral State is an impediment to the Catholic task of the salvation of souls, for its neutrality is merely an encouragement to, and an excuse for, the individual citizen's neglect of his religious duties.

The strength of Catholic feeling upon the question of education was vividly demonstrated in March, 1925, when the Herriot Government introduced the interconfessional school system at Colmar. The protests in Alsace were widespread, and the Bishop of Strasbourg was active in leading the opposition. He ordered a three days' strike of the Colmar school-children, and his orders were faithfully obeyed. The Government did not yield to the extent of removing the new system from Colmar, but it promised later that none of the existing confessional schools should be abolished. The strike had been a powerful manifestation of Catholic feeling; it was also an occasion of opposition to the Government, and that opposition was strengthened by the existence of numerous other grievances. The policy of the Radical-Socialists provided the aggrieved with the opportunity and the excuse to organize, and so it was that the declaration of M. Herriot was followed by the blossoming of autonomism in a new stage of growth. For the Catholics, that is for the majority of Catholics who clung to their Germanic traditions,—it was most opportune. They were provided with a trump card. For them "autonomism can be, if not a definite programme, which it probably never will be, at least a scarecrow which will be used at the opportune moment. There is no doubt

that this political position is very strong. . . . *Do ut des.* . . . It is not France who is trying to win back Alsatian Catholicism. On the contrary, it is the Alsatian clergy who claim to manage France, sure as they are of their traditional positions. Autonomy is the Damocles' sword, desirable and opportune." Thus the policy of most of the priests who are now identified with the autonomy movement, and certainly of their leader, the Abbé Haegy, is and always has been primarily "religious." Should the support of autonomy cease to further what they conceive to be their religious interest, they would not hesitate to change their front. The attitude of the Abbé Haegy and of his followers has been often discussed and often misrepresented. He has been well described by M. Gillouin as "Catholique d'abord, Alsacien ensuite, Français ou Allemand, s'il en reste," and the correctness of the description has been acknowledged by the Abbé himself. But it is incomplete unless it is made clear that the "Catholique d'abord" is a Catholic trained in a German university and that that training not only taught him to regard the lay State as an abomination against which it is his duty to struggle, but also made it impossible for him fully to comprehend and appreciate the mentality of those Catholics who, living in such a State, appeared to acquiesce in a secular tyranny. From the French State there is nothing for the Alsatian Catholic to gain and everything to fear; from the French Catholics there is nothing to gain because they have nothing to give. But in Germany the Revolution, though it overthrew an Empire, did not impair the position of the two great confessions which were among the bulwarks of the Imperial régime. The Constitution of Weimar recognizes them as State corporations, whose property is guaranteed and whose aims are confounded with those of the State. It should, then, be no reason for wonder if the Abbé Haegy shows sympathy towards a State which grants such recognition to the Catholic religion, or if Alsatian Catholics should prefer to maintain their relations with the Catholics of Germany rather than to co-operate with the Catholics of France, whose mentality they do not understand and whose language they speak imperfectly. The French cry out much at this seeming lack of patriotism, but the cause of it lies far back in the war of 1870, which first definitely submitted religion in Alsace to the powerful influences of Germanism.

The Colmar school strike of March, 1925, had displayed the unanimity of Catholic opinion, but the autonomist movement, which first reappeared in the open in May, was to show its disunion. The Bishop of Strasbourg, a Lorrainer who had served in the French army, had gladly and vigorously headed the opposition of Catholic Alsace to the extension of the inter-

confessional school system; that was definitely a religious issue. But the programme of autonomy was not; it included clauses to attract Catholic support, but its main purpose was political and also, in the Bishop's eyes, disloyal. A programme as radical as that of the Heimattbund made conciliation and the reform of grievances much harder for the French Government and constituted an attempt to alienate the affections of the Alsatians from France. The autonomist movement brought the western and the eastern conceptions of Catholicism once more into conflict. The eastern conception had the great majority of adherents, and the autonomist movement, as M. Vermeil pointed out, gave it an exceedingly strong political position. But that position was won at the cost of a schism, and the conflict was brought into sharper prominence because the Bishop of the diocese was in the minority. Eloquently and excellently he thundered against clericalism, but the denunciation was unintelligible to fifty per cent. of his clergy. He diagnosed the autonomist tactics most exactly and condemned them most thoroughly, but the condemnation was powerless to alter them or to restrain his clergy from using forbidden means to attain the desired end. The French Government had attempted conciliation, and M. Poincaré gave a solemn assurance that nothing should be done by his Government to endanger the Concordat or to infringe the religious rights of the Alsatian people. But the pledge of a party leader bound only his supporters, and the validity of M. Poincaré's undertaking might not endure more than a few months. However unlikely it was that another Socialist Government would be anxious to repeat M. Herriot's experience, there was nothing to prevent it from taking the risk of doing so. This was the logic of the majority of Alsatian Catholics, who required a more solid satisfaction; it was unassailable and practically justified by the continued and active hostility of the Socialists in Alsace. The autonomist movement had succeeded in cleaving all the older political parties in Alsace, but the U.P.R. was one of the latest to be sundered. Its divisions had long been known, but neither party was anxious to make them absolute. The alliance of Catholics and Communists in the municipal elections, another result of the autonomist movement, precipitated the schism, and in 1929 the patriotic section, that which represented French Catholicism, severed its connection with the U.P.R. and formed a new party, the A.P.N.A. (Action Populaire Nationale d'Alsace).

The position of the different confessions in Alsace to-day thus seems to be pregnant with paradox of which the autonomist programme is the creator. The bitterest enemy of the Catholic

A.P.N.A. is the Catholic U.P.R. The Catholic U.P.R. counts the Communists among its allies who desire autonomy above all. But the Communists of Alsace, though they profess themselves true sons of Moscow, are not as other Communists. Many of them are known to go to mass and to vote for the retention of "religieuses" in the schools. Nevertheless their Moscovite connection condemns them in the eyes of "good Frenchmen," and to counter this "unholy" and unpatriotic alliance of U.P.R. Catholics and Communists the A.P.N.A. Catholics combined in the municipal elections last autumn to form an "anti-autonomist front" with the Socialists. This alliance was as promptly denounced as "unholy" by the U.P.R.; for is not a rabidly anti-clerical Socialist far more to be abominated than a pious churchgoing Communist? The political implications of the autonomist movement have in fact exercised increasing influence upon the conduct of both sections of Catholic opinion in Alsace, and they have more acutely divided the Lutherans. But the Protestants have no political parties of their own, and so, while their influence is much less, division in their ranks does not bring them such discredit. The constant abuse hurled by each party of Catholics at the other does little good to either. The A.P.N.A. produces a newspaper in German, to the fury of the U.P.R., which had formerly the monopoly of the Catholic press in that language. But the real result of this bitter rivalry is likely to be the disgust of a wider circle of readers. The schism in the U.P.R. may be the prelude to the discrediting of the old German politico-ecclesiastical system which has so long been so powerful in Alsace. It may lead to the victory of western conceptions, but will it be the victory of French Catholicism or of French anti-clericalism? Disgust leads to indifference or to hostility as often as to reform. It may or may not be without significance that M. Herriot was able to deliver a public lecture undisturbed in Colmar last November. The subject was not political, but a varied audience gave him a warm welcome. Three years ago he would have been shouted down, whatever his subject, and five years ago it would scarcely have been safe for him to set foot in Alsace at all.

PATRICK BURY.

MISCELLANEA

NOTES AND COMMENTS

THE present issue opens with three of the series of Soloviev's "Easter Letters," which have not hitherto, we understand, been translated into English. They have been translated by a Russian lady, Mrs. Shiolovsky, now living in Paris, and we are glad to publish them as the work of one of Russia's greatest Christian thinkers. Among other contributors, the Rev. E. C. Mortimer is Vicar of Chittlehampton, North Devon. Dr. Norman Sykes is Lecturer in History at King's College, London, and the author of a fine study of Edmund Gibson, Bishop of London in the eighteenth century. Mr. Patrick Bury is a nephew of the late Regius Professor of History at Cambridge.

We regret that Messrs. Longmans, Green and Co. were wrongly stated in our last issue to be the publishers of *The Evangelical Doctrine of Holy Communion*. The book is published by Messrs. Heffer and Sons.

We have received a copy of Part II. of the Archdeacon of Chichester's *A Simple Catechism on the Catholicity and Continuity of the Church of England* (S.P.C.K., 2d.). It is concerned especially with the "chief changes which were made in the Doctrine, Ceremonial, and Government of the Church of England during the Reformation"; and, like its predecessor, it is full of sound and pithy teaching, and should prove a most useful guide in combating the errors both of Geneva and of Rome.

We publish below two letters on the subject of hunting. Mrs. Binstead's letter, though not addressed to us directly, seems to put the case against this type of sport so effectively that we have asked her permission to print it, and have also requested Mr. Shebbeare to give us his comments in reply. The correspondence must now cease.

CORRESPONDENCE

LETTER TO THE REV. C. J. SHEBBEARE

February 27, 1931.

SIR,

Being at present abroad, I have only just received my January and February numbers of *THEOLOGY*, and have read—with some distress—your "Sermon in Defence of Hunting."

I hope you will have patience with me if I say that you quite misapprehend the grounds on which increasing numbers of thoughtful people consider hunting unjustifiable—i.e., if you seriously believe "Rigorism," or a desire to suppress enjoyment in which they do not share, to be the cause of such condemnation. For you do not find these people opposing football, rowing, cricket, polo, aviation, mountaineering, or any but what are known as *blood sports*; therefore it cannot reasonably be imagined that they are enemies to all happiness and amusement in which they may not themselves take part. The ground for their objection is shown quite

simply by your own words, admitting that your "amusement entails some suffering, in some cases considerable suffering," and making it abundantly clear that, in defending the infliction of this suffering, you exalt your own pleasure at the expense of a defenceless creature's pain.

That this can be done without compunction presupposes, I think, *not* "cold-blooded cruelty"—still less "sadism" (its most evil refinement)—but it *does* imply callousness and indifference, either owing to complete lack of imagination, or to the assumption that one's own pleasure and excitement may be legitimately enjoyed, no matter what suffering they happen to entail.

That this is the assumption seems clear, for you speak of hunting as "an animal instinct, not merely natural, but good," and say that we should "refuse to condemn the infliction on animals of such suffering as this impulse involves."

And here may I say that, having endeavoured to follow your advice and "think out for myself" your suggested analogy between the sporting and the sexual instinct, I am driven to the conclusion that there is none whatever. I dislike the Rigorist Code as much as you do, but it has no application here. We do not condemn hunting because it gives pleasure; on the contrary, we condemn it because it gives pain.

I have *not* heard it said of blood sports, "Here is something coarse and violent, can it possibly be consistent with Christian discipleship?" (*War* is "coarse and violent," but just warfare is consistent therewith.)

Rather do I feel that "here is something in which the selfish and ruthless side of our nature is given full rein," and in which the merciless cruelty of the mob-spirit tends to assert itself. I have never heard "the sporting instinct" more justly defined than by yourself, when you call it "the natural passion for the pursuit and killing of the lower animals."

But when you add that "love and sympathy with animals exist generally in a marked degree among those who love sport," I can but marvel that "love and sympathy" should find expression in the slow harrying, hunting and spearing of an otter; the chasing for long hours and final "breaking up" of a fox; the coursing (often in an enclosed space, where escape is impossible) of a timid creature like the hare; the horrible scenes at the "digging out" of a fox or badger, and the like!

I am afraid I cannot agree that even if a "great number of human beings" may "gain health and healthy pleasure from the killing of, say, one fox," we should conclude that they might not just as well gain these advantages in a less questionable way.

Further, the fact that immense numbers of human beings derived (as they undoubtedly did) great pleasure from witnessing the horrors of the Roman arenas, or—in our own country until less than a hundred years ago—the "sports" of bull and bear baiting, would, by this analogy, have been a sound reason for not interfering with their enjoyment; indeed, we know that, in the latter case, most impassioned appeals were issued for the continuance of such time-honoured British institutions.

Finally, you must forgive me for saying that to quote our Lord's words in S. Luke xi. 46 as applicable to those who would restrain their fellow-men from cruel actions is to read into them a meaning which we must all know He would have sternly repudiated.

I am, Sir,

Yours faithfully,

(MRS.) M. A. BINSTAD.

MR. SHEBBEARE'S COMMENTS

I am delighted to comment on this temperately worded letter.

(1) I accept gladly Mrs. Binstead's personal disavowal of the prohibitionist spirit. But it exists, and it is *one* of the supports of the Anti-Sport agitation. Thus, though legal restriction is sometimes necessary, I still ask those who favour repressive legislation to read Luke xi. 46 in a spirit of self-examination. His association of the calf's death with merriment (Luke xv. 23) should check hasty dogmatism about the opinions of our Lord. Would He have favoured "anti-sport legislation"?

(2) I did *not* say that my own pleasures may be "legitimately enjoyed, no matter what suffering they entail." The excellent flavour of *pâté de foie gras* is, I hold, not worth the suffering which produces it. In the case of field sports the balance seems to me to incline the other way. The group of farmers, quarrymen, pitmen, etc., with whom I hunt the hare on these moors are taking the very healthiest outdoor pleasure this district affords. Unless it is always wrong to inflict death or pain on animals for human benefit, this balancing of their suffering against our good cannot be wrong in principle. The vegetarian, the pacifist, the anti-conscriptionist, have (for what it is worth) a consistency which some people lack.

(3) Mrs. Binstead, of course, does not see that there *is* any good in sport. Yet probably she would accept the argument that the distinctive pleasure of cricket or golf is a good thing which could not be abolished without loss. Some of us who have no taste for games find that few joys equal the thrill of the chase; that pleasure in good houndwork, etc., is intelligent and healthy. Mrs. Binstead would think it less "questionable"—all the flower of Rigorism flourishes in that "lonely word"—if we took long walks. But we are hard-working people, and in our brief leisure we want something more thrilling.

(4) If the sole ground against blood sports is that they "give pain," it is relevant to point out that our preservation of a species is giving happy lives to individual animals in the future: that the total extermination of stags and foxes is not a conspicuously *humane* solution of the problem. But if the species are to continue, then it is a question for dispassionate discussion whether any alternative method of keeping their numbers down would give less pain than hunting gives. Not every small-holder is a crack shot.

(5) The fact is that the opponents of hunting seldom confine themselves to this plain question of loss and gain to the animals. They wish to restrain our evil propensities. Now before one seeks to alter other people's lives, one ought at least to try to understand them. Mrs. Binstead speaks of the "ruthless cruelty of the mob-spirit." This would be a fair description of street boys stoning a cat. It is a false description of our disciplined "field." We take trouble to breed small hounds which shall "give the hare a chance." We take much trouble that death shall be instantaneous. Our spirit is that which finds constant expression in every sporting paper—"scent failed after an excellent hunt of forty minutes." Mrs. Binstead accuses sportsmen of "lack of imagination." As a moral theologian I have felt bound to discover as much as possible about the probable sufferings of the hunted animal. Is it wrong if in the field I refuse to dwell on sufferings which I think it lawful to inflict? Am I bound when I eat beef to picture the slaughter-house? The truth is that if the

Anti-Sport agitators looked at the problem in a practical and objective way, it is on the slaughter-houses that they would concentrate their attention. If a responsible body of people will collect funds for presenting humane killers to butchers who will use them, I will subscribe. Meanwhile I ask Mrs. Binstead's readers to look again at my sermon.

C. J. SHEBBEARE.

NOTES ON PERIODICALS

Zeitschrift für die N.T.liche Wissenschaft. 1.30. Heft 3/4.

This double number contains a very long essay on John Philoponus the Monophysite by TH. HERMANN, and short articles on the *Decretum Gelasianum* (E. SCHWARTZ), the Georgian Versions of the Gospels (G. PERADSE), and an unpublished biblical florilegium (D. DE BRUYNE). The contribution of chief interest is BULTMANN's fascinating essay on the conception of seeing God. The original Greek idea was that the gods could be seen, but would not normally allow it; their presence was accompanied by fear, even danger. Later came the Platonic view that the Godhead could be seen by *nous*, the eye of the soul. But eventually Greek thought appropriated the Eastern idea of "the unknown God." Like can only be seen by like. By preparation, asceticism, man kills the human in him and is prepared for revelation, in which a new eye, essentially divine, is given him. In the mystic experience he has a foretaste of the eschatological vision awaiting him. With this conception came formal meditation and devotional practice.

In the O.T. the first stage is as among the Greeks. To see God was dangerous. Moses (Deut. xxxiv. 10) was an exception—he saw God face to face. The second stage was never reached. There is no Hebrew word for "invisible." Man has no *nous*, or eye of the soul, with which to see the invisible God; rather, uncleanness prevents vision. In course of time the formula "see Yahweh's face" gives way to "appear before Yahweh" (in the sanctuary). In the N.T. to see God keeps the sense of "appearing before Him," in purity of heart. There is a strong belief in an eschatological seeing of God, the whole redeemed community appearing before Him, which is not in the least a Greek idea. It is important to note the complete absence from the N.T. of the Greek-Oriental conception of mystic sight consequent on an assimilation, at least temporary and provisional, of the human to the divine.

E. HIRSCH sees in the Judaizers of Galatians Gentile Christians who had been persuaded by the second wave of converts at Jerusalem, men of Pharisaic origin, to undergo circumcision, but yet could not keep the whole law, which was bound up with an alien social system.

W. C. VAN UNNIK calls attention to passages in Pollux (*Onomastica*, ix. 113, 129) which exactly explain the mocking of Jesus before the Sanhedrin, most clearly described in Luke xxii. 63-65. There were two kinds of blind man's buff, one in which the blind man had to "prophecy" who touched him, the other in which he was asked with which hand he was struck.

E. BICKERMANN discusses the letter to Aristaeus. It is a Utopia, written between 145 and 127 B.C. Why does the author of 2 Peter speak of "righteous Lot"? Dr. RAPPAPORT answers the question by quotations from Rabbinic literature, and some from Christian writers. Lot was the

father of Moab (Gen. xix. 37), and therefore ancestor of Ruth, of David, and eventually of the Messiah. Conduct which seems to us unfitting a righteous man was overruled by God for good.

J. JEREMIAS has a fascinating discussion of the "head of the corner stone." On the basis of passages in the Testament of Solomon he shows that ἀκρογωνιαίος is good secular Greek, meaning the last or coping stone of a building, placed over the principal door, or rather the place where the stone was put. In view of our Lord's attitude towards the Temple and His use of the symbol "rock" or "stone," we may well believe that He described Himself as (1) the stone which (2) crowned (3) the Temple and (4) was the place of entry.

W. K. L. C.

Ephemerides Theologicæ Lovanienses. July, 1930.

The principal article in this number, from the pen of the Jesuit Father Galtier, is a long, careful and elaborate study of St. Thomas' treatment of the Person of Christ, especially as regards the Unity of Person in Duality of Natures. The author distinguishes three opinions held on this subject in the mediæval theological schools. The first is that of *homó assumptus*, following, in its phraseology at any rate, a tradition of St. Augustine, St. Leo the Great and others. This view emphasizes the distinction between the Eternal Son who unites Himself to a Man and the Man who is united to the Son of God. This Man, however, was held never to have existed or to have had any merit apart from the Son of God, and in this way it was sought to avoid Nestorianism. The opposite extreme opinion was that what was assumed by Christ was united to Him by a merely accidental union. Thus, before his elevation, Pope Alexander III. had gone so far as to say, *Christus, secundum quod homo, non est Persona, et, ut verius loquamur nec mentiamur, nec aliquid*. But such an extreme position—*nec aliquid*—was soon condemned as contradicting "of a reasonable soul and human flesh subsisting." The way was thus open for a mediating position which, while denying that in Christ there was a human *suppositum*, yet contended that His Humanity constituted a "substance" or a concrete Nature. It was in this sense that St. Thomas argued the question. His treatment of it is to be found in many of his works, but the most important place is in the sixteenth and seventeenth Questions of the Third Part of the *Summa*. Of course he acknowledges that the mode of the union of the two Natures in Christ is beyond our comprehension, *nobis ineffabilis*, as he says. Our nearest approach is to be found in the union of body and soul, but this is far from being an exact parallel. The eternal Unity of Christ's Person continues uninterrupted by the assumption of Human Nature. His Person exists as an *ens quod*, as distinct from His Human Nature which does indeed exist and has an *esse*, but it exists as an *ens quo*. The *esse* of the Son of God which is the *suppositum* of His Person is His Divine Nature. *Ens consequitur naturam*, but an *ens quo* is a real *ens*, although it is not an *ens quod*, and does not become the *suppositum* of a Person. The extreme scholastic subtlety both of St. Thomas and of his interpreter makes it a matter of difficulty to compress the argument intelligently into reasonable space, but as St. Thomas' doctrine of the Blessed Trinity has been appealed to in some quarters as favouring in some degree Sabellianizing theories, it is well to have expressed his real view of the Person of Christ.

The rest of the number is taken up with some discussions and with the

usual very full reviews of current literature. In one of the discussions M. A. Spaldak replies to criticisms upon his book about the reunion of Christendom. He takes a very sympathetic and moderate position with regard to those not of the Roman obedience, defending for instance the use of the word "Church" in speaking of "Anglicans or Orthodox," and protesting that men of good faith should never be spoken of in opprobrious terms. There is a very short notice, five lines, of the Lambeth Conference.

W. R. V. BRADE.

Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses. October, 1930.

In this number Fr. L. Charlier concludes his study of the relation of the soul to supernatural Grace as taught in St. Thomas. How, in the light of the Thomistic maxim that Grace perfects nature but does not destroy it, are we to understand the natural human desire for beatitude? Perfect beatitude consists in the vision of the Divine Essence, but our nature does not contain any power to grant us such a vision. Human nature, in fact, is ordered to two distinct ends, one which is proportionate to its own capacities, namely human happiness, and the other which exceeds its capacities as human, namely the Divine Vision. The possession of the desire for beatitude is no warrant of the possession also of any power of its own whereby our nature could attain to the Vision of God. That attainment can only come through Grace and infused theological virtues. There is a passive capacity of man's mind for the True and of his will for the Good, or for God, but for this passive capacity to be realized God Himself must fecundate it by those supernatural means which He has Himself revealed. These means, Divine Grace and its concomitant supernatural aids, though beyond our nature, are entirely in harmony with it, and are indeed its completion and its crown.

A very interesting article by Fr. de Vooght, O.S.B., discusses the causality of the Sacrament of Penance. What does this Sacrament do and how does it act? There is only one process of reconciliation of the soul and God; Penance either *re* or *voto* is the normal and indeed indispensable means thereof. The autonomy of the human will is always respected by God. Justification of the sinner only means Divine Grace rectifying the sinful will and restoring the sinner to friendship with God. The Sacrament is God's means whereby He transmits His efficacious Divine Action. The Sacrament cannot take the place of an imperfect act of will; contrition, in the Thomistic sense, is absolutely necessary for justification: *culpa actualis, etiam venialis, non dimittitur sine actuali contritionis motu*. No merely attrite sinner can be forgiven; there must be contrition even if it only comes while he is kneeling at the confessional. The Sacrament cannot take the place of contrition; it can, however, avail in God's Hands to produce it. Its *opus operatum* is the conversion of the soul under the influence of Grace. Modern authorities who speak of attrition usually, as a matter of fact, mean by it something that has already in it, perhaps only in germ, an element of the love of God, and so comes very near what St. Thomas means by contrition. Altogether a very thoughtful and penetrating article.

The number contains also the usual features, reviews and full bibliography.

W. R. V. BRADE.

Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses. January, 1931.

The first article in this number is from the pen of Fr. Penido, of Freiburg, Switzerland. It is a study on "the validity of the 'psychological' theory of the Trinity." By this is meant the doctrine adumbrated in St. Augustine and greatly elaborated by St. Thomas of the Processions of the Son and Holy Spirit on the analogy of thought and will in the human personality. This has been a generally accepted theory in the theological schools, but there have been divergent voices. The author of this article considers the theory thoroughly valid and sound. It covers the facts of reason and revelation and is free from objectionable anthropomorphism. It is consonant with a sound metaphysic of Being, for though the Divine Life is above the categories, it is still within the "transcendentals," such as being itself, truth and so on. Revealed Being is still Being, and every proposition which has for its purpose to demonstrate the removal of some defect from the Divine Nature is metaphysically certain. This doctrine of the Processions is psychological in Augustine but becomes fully metaphysical in Thomas. It is no anthropomorphism to predicate of God personality and intelligence and will. We do not attribute any merely human "Word" to God, but we attribute to Him, proportionately to His Nature, the analogical notion of "Word as Such." Finding intelligence in ourselves and seeing that it is a perfection of Being, we conclude that God, Who is at the height of all Being, must have intelligence, of course in a manner proper to Himself. As our "word" is to our minds, so is the Eternal Word to the Eternal Mind, and similarly with the Procession of Will, the Holy Spirit. By this means of expounding the Faith we acquire a real insight into the inner Life of God. We see that God has two and only two Processions. Being, Truth and Goodness ("transcendentals") exist in God; they give us Nature, Intelligence and Will, and round these, Intelligence and Will, all God's infinite attributes group themselves. No doubt from a purely metaphysical point of view this doctrine attains only to serious probability, but in the light of the Faith and of the history of theological thought it may safely be considered a practical certainty. It is borne out by the Prologue to St. John and confirmed by decisions of the Church.

This article is followed by an elaborate Latin essay on various points connected with predestination and God's pre-motions. God does not will that evil should happen, which would be itself evil, but He wills to permit the happening of evil and that is good. A third article returns to the subject of the place of Mary as Mediatrix and argues that Liguori was right as against Muratori and others, although it is admitted that he was no expert in the critical study of ancient documents. The mediation of Mary is proved by arguments analogous to those which have availed to establish her immaculate conception.

There are the usual full notices of European and American theological literature.

W. R. V. BRADE.

Revue d'Histoire Ecclésiastique.

In the January number Father Dhanis continues his instructive article on early sacramental forms. In his concluding remarks he lays special stress on the sacrament of marriage. Father Tolman adds to our grasp of Flacius Illyricus, historian of the Church. In his article there are many sidelights on sixteenth and seventeenth century Calvinism. Father Lesne

provides an elaborate note on "indominicatum" in the Churches of the Carolingian empire. "Dominicatus" means successively the part of each demesne which is cultivated on behalf of the lord, and Father Lesne investigates the reverse process.

R. H. M.

Bulletin of the John Rylands Library. January, 1931.

This is again a very interesting number, evincing many-sided scholarship. There is a lecture by Mr. H. B. Charlton on *Shakespeare's Recoil from Romanticism*, demonstrating the inadequacy of the classical comedy of Plautus and Terence, to which in certain of his plays Shakespeare turned, to provide a true representation of the manners and thought of Elizabethan times. "Love" is a motive in both, but with widely different meanings. Romance has made all the difference; he cannot really get away from it; it is "in the blood and in the spirit" of his age. Another article deals with the correspondence between Richard Baxter and the American John Eliot (1604-1690). Eliot has a curious scheme for Councils of the Reformed Church. They are to be District, Provincial, National and Œcumenical. The Œcumenical Council will have its seat in Jerusalem. Through it Christ will rule all the world in both civil and ecclesiastical affairs by the Word of His Mouth, delivered to twenty-four Delegates from twelve National synods, in the Hebrew tongue. The scheme does not seem to have been greeted with overmuch enthusiasm. Dr. Mingana continues his studies in Syriac and Garshuni manuscripts. In this number he gives a translation of the more important parts of the concluding section of the *Apocalypse of Peter*. This section is chiefly remarkable for (1) its curious docetic exposition of the Incarnation, "the jealous Lord sent His Son, who came down to earth and appeared in a covering which He chose to Himself from Light which He materialized"; and (2) its strong anti-Pauline bias. According to this Apocalypse, Paul was guilty of most questionable methods of evangelization, pretending to worship in heathen temples and so on, and also of tampering with sacred texts. Peter's highest mysteries are not to be divulged to "Paul and those who resemble him." Another curious feature is the lofty pre-eminence assigned to Rome, as centre of light and holiness, the faith of whose inhabitants will never fail. "Whichever nation does not profess the faith of Rome is remote from God." Dr. Mingana will not decide whether this is an interpolation or not. If it is not, then it is "certainly the most striking testimony that he has found in any eastern book in favour of the Church of Rome."

W. R. V. BRADE.

Journal of the Palestine Oriental Society. Vol. x., No. 4.

M. R. Neuville contributes an illustrated article on Prehistoric Palestine. Père A. Mallon gives a brief account of the Baptistery of the church at Sbeita in the Negeb. The church was destroyed in the seventh century, and the Baptistery dates from the sixth century at latest. Dr. C. C. McCown reviews appreciatively Father Koeppe's *Palästina: Die Landschaft in Karten und Bildern*, of which he says: "No work dealing with the historical portions of the Bible or with Palestinian history can be properly written without constant reference to material such as this book contains."

Mr. J. Ben Zevie writes of a stone in the Government Museum in Jerusalem which contains twelve lines in Samaritan script. The stone,

according to the testimony of one of the Samaritan priests, was brought about three years ago from Kafr Qallil, a village at the foot of Mount Gerizim. There is said to be a tradition amongst Nâblus Samaritans that a Samaritan settlement existed not long ago in Kafr Qallil. The tablet probably refers to the building of a synagogue there.

R. D. MIDDLETON.

Jewish Quarterly Review. Vol. xxi., No. 3.

Rabbi Joseph Marcus publishes a new leaf of Hebrew MS. of *Ben Sira* (Ecclesiasticus), containing chapters xxxii. 16 to xxxiv. 1, which he has discovered in the Library of the Jewish Theological Seminary, New York. This new text agrees on the whole with both the Greek and the Syriac versions. Professor Israel Davidson reviews Dr. Abraham Schechter's recent *Studies in Jewish Liturgy*.

Dr. Michael Ginsburg contributes a useful article on the *Fiscus Judaicus*, drawing from many sources in his account of its origins and history. The tax, by which every Jew was forced to pay for the right to practise his religion, was abolished by Julian the Apostate.

Professor Jacob Hoschander, continuing his survey of Biblical Literature, introduces us to an erratic German writer, von Oskar Goldberg, who holds, among other curious views, that the Cabbalah is in its elements older than the Pentateuch, which constitutes a protest against it! Hoschander writes rather bitterly of Professor R. A. S. Macalister's Schweich Lectures, *The Philistines, their History and Civilization*: "This scholar would credit the Philistines with the whole of Israel's civilization. Their name having become jestingly a term for narrow-mindedness and a common-place existence, Macalister appointed himself their champion in clearing the Philistines of this charge, and in his zeal he went so far as to endow them with achievements they never attained."

R. D. M.

The Canadian Journal of Religious Thought. Vol. viii., No. 1.

An admirable introduction to the theology of Karl Barth, by Dr. V. T. Hooft, makes this number well worth procuring by those, this side of the Atlantic, who would know more of a teacher with whom we certainly have to reckon. Barth himself says "it is a real question whether there is as much joy in heaven as there is on earth about the progress of the Barthian school," and, "when I look back on my way I see myself as one who tries to climb a church tower in great darkness, and who instead of getting hold of the hand-rail pulls the bell-rope. To his great astonishment he hears that the great bell is ringing so that all the world can hear it." On this Dr. Hooft remarks that the least we can do is to listen attentively. We ourselves would venture to endorse his verdict, for we believe that in so doing we shall hear a message that is much needed; and, to carry on the simile a little farther, one which will encourage us to return to the tower and try the steps rather than the later fixtures of a passing intellectual fashion.

H. S. M.

REVIEW

THE FAITH OF A MORALIST. By A. E. Taylor. Macmillan.
2 vols., 15s. each.

PERHAPS the most striking characteristic of this book is the way in which Professor Taylor holds together in close connection three aspects or points of view which are too often kept in isolation. The first is Metaphysics, or an inquiry into the ultimate nature of reality, and an attempt to gain a rational and coherent view of the universe; the second is Ethics, or a system of duties and of the chief good for man; and the third is Religion, or a doctrine of God and of our relationship to Him. Each of these spheres is generally made the subject of a specialized study, and stands aloof from the others. But Professor Taylor's book is an emphatic protest against all that. Its author is a great metaphysician, a Professor of Moral Philosophy, and a very competent theologian, all in one; and a great charm of his work lies in the fact that it shows how these three departments of thought can, and ought to, permeate and illustrate and supplement each other. It seems that the best way to review and commend the book is to describe some of its main positions.

To begin with, then, we have in chapter ii. of vol. i. some very timely remarks on the relation between

ACTUALITY AND VALUE

The two are often opposed to each other, judgments of value being contrasted with judgments of existence. But Taylor points out that when we talk of values we do not mean mere abstractions or logical concepts, but qualities exhibited in actual things, or persons, or events. Art, Science, Health are values not as abstract ideas, but as seen in things actually done, or lives actually lived. So, again, "Knowledge is a value" expresses the goodness of actual discovery of truth by actual intelligent minds; and in this connection he quotes Whitehead as saying "there is no such thing as mere value. Value is the word I use for the intrinsic reality of an event." And, on the other side, just as value implies existence, so existence implies value. In our life facts are given as having value; acts are apprehended as good or bad, art products as ugly or beautiful. Of course we may make mistakes in these apprehensions, but in any case we do not start with a dualism between bare "facts" given to us by themselves, on the one side, and our valuation or interpretation of them, on the other. "In life as we live it," he says, "all is given, facts and valuation together, in an undivided whole."

This protest against the severance of value from actuality seems very timely. It saves us from clumsy shallow antitheses, as when the statement that "Christ has the value of God" is made to burk the question whether He is actually God or not. The value of God is something possessed and exhibited by God. We pass next to his treatment of

TIME AND ETERNITY

Professor Taylor is much exercised with the difficulty of relating and reconciling these two spheres satisfactorily. (He deals with it in chapters iii. and iv. in vol. i., and in chapters iii. and viii. in vol. ii.) As a moralist he has to recognize the pressing importance of the temporal sphere: temporal events, incidents and ideals of individual life, progress aimed at and partially achieved, rises and falls in individual character and national morale—all these are the essential subject-matter of Ethics. But, on the other hand, they are the cause of "great intellectual discomfort to the metaphysician," who is mainly concerned with an eternal immutable order of things, with an intellectual system of laws and ideas which exist in majestic aloofness from the world of time and change and becoming. So we can see that Taylor's position as both a moralist and a metaphysician was a difficult one. He has to feel his way upwards from the temporal to the eternal. One step is to distinguish "clock time," of which each tick is a separate, disconnected event, from the time of which we are conscious in our actual experience—time which is a process, a development, in which the past is not just left behind, but carried up into the present and so helps to mould the future, what Bergson calls *real duration*. And he points out that in certain exalted experiences, as in the enjoyment of great music, "the sense of past and future is lost in a rapture which is all present"; and such experience is a sort of foretaste of eternity as "whole, simultaneous, and complete fruition" (vol. i., p. 91). And he goes on to argue that individuality, in life and history, is far too great and robust a thing to be set aside as an irrelevant and regrettable accident in the order of the world. Individuality is not a caricature and distortion of eternal truth; it is rather a pilgrim on the road to eternity. It has purpose, and its purpose is the pursuit of good, a pursuit which experience shows cannot be satisfied with secular enjoyment or secular aims. Such objects are partial and successive and are inconsistent with the *unity* which characterizes individuality. There is only a real unity of personality, when the good aimed at is "one and all-embracing, a real and single living good, which is the source of all goodness and leaves nothing of the good outside itself," i.e., God (vol. i., p. 101).

He sums up: "time is the stuff out of which a personal moral life is to be made," and it is made by transcending time (vol. i., p. 119). That is, time as actually experienced in life is not a contrary of being and eternity, not a mere casual haphazard flux of becoming, but a process towards real being, a *γένεσις εἰς οὐσίαν* as Plato says in the *Philebus*. So the temporal process is a striving towards eternity, and the two spheres are thus connected.

THE SUPERNATURAL AND THE MIRACULOUS

(Vol. ii., Chapter iv.)

Professor Taylor draws a distinction between *supernatural* and *miraculous*. All religion is necessarily supernatural. "Religion," he says, "exists whenever, and only when, there is the conscious domination of life by aspiration towards an absolute and abiding good, which is recognized as being also the supreme reality upon which the aspirant is utterly dependent." "Religion is thus consciousness of the strictly supernatural, transcendent something which is above all mutability, passage and history, or it is nothing."

The miraculous is a subclass of the supernatural, and is only important for religion so far as it can be regarded "as an indication of the reality of the supernatural"; that is, regarded not as a sheer wonder or portent, but as an effect produced by a supremely real and true Being.

The strongest objection urged against miracles is not that they would be violations of "laws of nature," for the whole conception of inviolable natural law seems to be more and more abandoned in present-day science; it is rather the view, or the assumption, of anthropologists that a belief in them is due to delusions of savage and primitive man, "a simple-minded creature who has not learned to distinguish between fancy and fact," whose primitive credulity is unbounded, and who has "no conception of causality or of a fixed regular routine in the sequences of nature" (vol. ii., p. 158).

Professor Taylor doubts whether primitive man was quite so simple as all that, and makes the pertinent reminder that "the great positive religions have had their beginnings in historical times and among civilized peoples," and adds that if St. Paul had thought that resurrection from the dead was just as likely to happen as anything else, he would not have emphasized so strongly the auspicious and exceptional character of Christ's resurrection as a proof that he had been "declared the Son of God with power" (p. 160).

The supernatural is wider and more comprehensive than

the miraculous; but if we really believe in a supernatural and transcendent sphere at all, we shall not believe that it must always express itself in an unalterable routine of nature, but shall be ready to recognize "something catastrophic, violently irruptive, at moments of critical importance," by which "anticipation based on 'customary experiences' will be liable to be suddenly and startlingly shattered," just as in us human beings a customary cause of habitual action is occasionally abandoned at some special crisis of life.

A miracle, then, is a "wonder," a startling event, not a mere unintelligible portent, but a sign, a sign of the direct action of God, a revelation of His transcendent, divine purpose.

Miracles, lastly, may be said to help us to a coherent view of the universe, by showing that the physical order is taken up into union with a spiritual in a sacramental harmony. They emphasize a spiritual order of the world by shattering the one-sided usurpations of the physical and the dull customary routine to which it condemns all life. They are "significant clues to the ultimate pattern underlying all events" and "disclosures of a self-coherent supernatural source of the temporal process" (vol. ii., p. 192).

IMMORTALITY

(Vol. i., Chapters vii., viii., ix.)

Professor Taylor's argument for immortality is based on the facts and aspirations of the moral life.

The question at stake is whether the moral life presents us with functions which demand the other world as an environment; *i.e.*, whether the highest good which we aim at is such that it cannot be obtained in this life. And his answer, given with great eloquence and force, is that "the destruction of human personality would stultify the whole moral life by making its supreme end unattainable" (vol. i., p. 281). The highest human good cannot be conceived in terms of the activities and environment of our temporal embodied life, since it consists really in the re-making of character or personality round a new supernatural centre. In all moral aspiration the good is conceived as a secure and abiding possession which cannot be taken from us.

The "making of a soul" involves sacrifice, the surrender and abandonment of all that is in conflict with that work; and unless the whole process of this sacrifice and surrender is to end in futility and failure, its completion can only be found in "the winning of a personality absolutely above circumstance and mutability by a supreme surrender of the whole realm of merely temporal values, as dying out of time into a real eternity" (p. 311).

In chapter ix., "The Goal of the Moral Life," he considers the general character of the life of the blessed in the other world. Here there is only one point which I want to refer to. He raises the question whether the moral life ceases at death or is continued in a higher form in heaven. His point is that whilst aspiration is the condition of moral progress on earth, aspiration and attainment may be combined in heaven, and that there would be room there for "a very real and intense moral life"; in fact, that "social service" might exist in heaven as much as on earth, though its quality might be rather different.

AUTHORITY

(Vol. ii., Chapter v.)

Here again, as in the case of Time and Eternity, Professor Taylor deals with a certain tension between Religion and Philosophical Speculation. Here the tension is between the absolute authority claimed by revealed religion in matters of faith and practice, on the one hand, and the unfettered freedom of individuals to arrive at their own conclusions on such matters, on the other.

The contrast is illustrated by an anecdote. It was suggested to a Roman Catholic theologian that there seemed to be no real difference between his position and that of a well-known Anglo-Catholic. The Romanist's reply was: "Pardon me, we are at the opposite pole from *x*. He holds every doctrine that we hold, but holds them all for the entirely irrelevant reason that he thinks them true."

In resolving this tension between absolute authority and unfettered freedom he begins by pointing out that the authority, however imperatively conceived, is always regarded as being subject to certain reservations. Whether the infallibility is claimed for Pope or Council or Bible, it only holds in certain spheres or subject to certain conditions being fulfilled; and this fact allows a certain exercise of criticism and speculation.

Secondly, he distinguishes two factors or elements in ecclesiastical authority. There is, first, the immediate experience that comes to us from without, something that "is not constructed by, but *given* to, our thinking," something inexhaustible by analysis, "an implicit and dimly apprehended infinite" something "numinous." This objectively real element is the ultimate source and sanction of authority, as being something which comes to us and is not an idea of our own.

"Authority," he says, "is the self-assertion of the reality of an experience which contains more than any individual experient has succeeded in analyzing out and extricating for him-

self" (p. 214). Then there is a second factor which supplements and to a certain extent modifies the first in this matter of authority. Alongside of this direct apprehension of given fact there is the interpretation and construction placed upon it by the mind which receives it; and these two factors, the direct datum from above and the mental interpretation and construction, are inseparably united (as was the case with value and actuality). The datum is interpreted in the very act of being apprehended. There is no such thing as a pure feeling independent of some form of interpretation. We never, *e.g.*, have a pure apprehension of *whiteness*; the feeling is at once interpreted, rightly or wrongly, either perhaps as a ghost or as a washing hung out and flapping in the air. So, too, in religious experience we cannot separate one element which is all "givenness" from another which is all mental construction. Thus the authoritativeness or infallibility, in religion as elsewhere, belongs to the object as given from outside; but since this datum from outside is always manipulated by the mind in the very act of receiving it, we have to recognize that the direct experience and the rational faith are inseparably linked together. The directest bit of religious experience is in itself shaped and moulded by faith, and we are not justified in holding that experience is something independent of faith and the source from which faith is subsequently derived.

So, then, the givenness of religion makes it authoritative; it is from heaven, not of men; but the factor of mental construction which goes with it prevents it being regarded as safe from inerrancy in detail. And this work of the mind which is present in the earliest moment of apprehension goes on as a continual process of analysis and explanation and systematizing which builds up the whole theological corpus. The authority of religion is the authority of the whole Church, and in the course of its progress through the ages errors made by individuals in their interpretation of God's message tend to cancel each other and be corrected, and the living testimony of the whole body in all the ages "is mediated," in Taylor's words, "through the human personality of which the Gospel narrative is the record" (p. 242).

Religion is thus authoritative, because resting ultimately on real historical experiences of contact with God, received and interpreted by human minds, and co-ordinated into a coherent system through "the testimony of those in whom it is richest and most pronounced" (p. 232).

Lastly, Taylor illustrates the authority of our religion, which is not the same as literal infallibility from the case of conscience. Our conscience speaks to us with the absolute authority of a

categorical imperative, and we feel it our bounden duty to obey its voice, and a sin to disobey; but we know also, on subsequent reflection, that at times it has been mistaken and requires correction through our ignorance of all the facts or the warping influence of our surroundings.

I should like to commend this treatment of authority as most valuable and suggestive.

SACRAMENTALISM

(Vol. ii., Chapter vii.)

Sacraments, he tells us, are held to be "physical acts, concerned with sensible objects, through which the Creator conveys a spiritual benefit, exercises a spiritual effect, within the spiritual life of a rational creature." So the question is, whether these physical acts and objects can become channels of spiritual grace; and it is very significant that Taylor declares that the spiritual benefit is held to be conveyed by the Creator Himself, not independently by mere ritual acts or words of the priest. This, in itself, disposes of the rather futile objection of Bishop Barnes that such words and actions are unable to impart spiritual reality to inanimate matter. The Creator of both the spiritual and the material order is obviously able to use the material as channels for the spiritual, and in doing so uses the words and acts of the priest as His instrument.

Further, in reference to the view of sacraments as survivals of magic and claiming the efficacy of magic, he has two valuable criticisms: first, that if sacraments are, as just stated, believed to be historically of divine institution and to derive their effects from that fact of being divinely appointed, it would make no difference whatever to their character if every detail involved in them had in previous ages been used in the practices of nature-magic where there was no divine institution and no belief in effects divinely produced. It is the divine action that gives the Sacrament its meaning and its value.

And, secondly, he very adroitly turns the edge of the special *scientific* objection to sacraments as forms of magic. "If," he says, "we are to look for a modern equivalent for magical operations, we shall find it much more truly in the triumphs of applied science than in the sacraments of religion." Magic and science are both purely secular in their methods, and in both cases the results are held to be produced automatically through acquaintance with the appropriate formula or spell. "In fact," he says, "it is the technician, who knows how to turn physical science to a utilitarian account, who is the real counterpart in our society of the wizards and sorcerers of darker

ages." He suggests that sanitary engineering and electric lighting are illustrations of modern magic.

It only remains for me to thank Professor Taylor very heartily for the really great book which he has given us, and to commend it most strongly to all your readers.

A. CHANDLER (*Bishop*).

NOTICES

REPORT OF THE ANGLO-CATHOLIC CONGRESS, 1930. The Catholic Literature Association. 7s. 6d.

The subject of the Anglo-Catholic Congress of 1930 was "The Church," and the Report contains most of the papers and speeches delivered at the meetings, printed in the same fine type as in the former companion volumes. The main theme is treated under headings supplied by the four "Notes" of the Church, three papers being allotted to each, except to "Apostolicity," which has two. There are also four practical "Instructions," each with two papers, on "Confession," "The Eucharist," "Prayer," and "Retreats," and three Appendices, each containing several short speeches on "Men and the Church," "Women and the Church," and "The Church Overseas." It is impossible to summarize or even to refer to the already condensed contents of all these papers. Indeed, they were prepared for delivery to a large and sympathetic audience and were, for the most part, intended to be heard rather than read except, perhaps, by those who heard them. They must be read sympathetically to be judged fairly. The first paper in each of the sections dealing with the "Notes" of the Church is naturally the weightiest; and it may be suggested to those not wholly in sympathy with what they conceive to be the Anglo-Catholic conception of the Church, that it would be a useful exercise to make a sincere attempt to see how far they can really go with the fundamental ideas of these four papers, adding as a fifth the second paper on "Apostolicity." The result could scarcely fail to be an increase in understanding and goodwill, and a reduction of disagreement.

There can be no doubt that what the Editors call "the Church consciousness" is a growing reality among us, and it affords a real ground for the closer drawing together of elements in the Church of England which naturally tend to diverge. The Church is, as Sir Edwyn Hoskyns well says, "involved in the Messiahship of Jesus." In several of the papers there is explicit evidence of deep devotion to the Anglican Church, the absence of which in not a little Anglo-Catholic teaching has often encouraged suspicion and distrust and, therefore inevitably, misunderstanding. Certain secessions to Rome are explained as due to "a mistaken view of what the Anglican conception of the Church is. They have measured her by standards by which she does not claim or wish to be meted. They have imparted standards of judgment from without, and not unnaturally found that they were inapplicable to a Church which does not need to be measured in this way." Another writer says that, if we are not led away by controversies of the moment, "we can find in the Anglican conception of the Church the true and only possible way to the unity of

Christendom." There is indeed another conception—claiming exclusively the title Catholic—of the Unity, Catholicity and Apostolicity of the Church; but the writers of these papers are all aware that no mere return to mediæval ideas is either possible or desirable. In the life of the Church, as in the lives of men, nothing can make the past as though it had not been, nor restore the years which the locust hath eaten; and it was not one of the purposes of the Incarnation to deprive subsequent history of moral significance, or to absolve us from the obligation of following its guidance.

Doubtless some of the secondary papers in this volume would offer a rich field for the hostile critic, and one not wholly hostile may observe that to speak of Confession, as nowadays practised, as "of divine appointment for the forgiveness of post-baptismal sin" without further qualification, or as "in accordance with Christian tradition from the beginning," is so misleading as not to be justified either by brevity or by the necessities of popular exposition. But the supposed need for such apologetic should disappear with the growth of that "dynamic" conception of the Church which, as distinct from that conception of which the Vincentian Canon is the watchword, is in fact held by most of the contributors to this Report. If in some of these papers there is a tendency to confuse continuity in language with continuity in things, it is more than counterbalanced by the fact that the more important papers suggest that in certain fundamental matters the differences between the writers and some who would not be reckoned Anglo-Catholics concern words rather than things. To one such reader, not a little in this Report encourages the hope of a growing inner unity within the Anglican Church, and a consequent increase of effectiveness in the Church's main work in the world.

J. S. BEZZANT.

SIX GREAT MISSIONARIES OF THE SIXTEENTH AND SEVENTEENTH CENTURIES. By David Jenks. A. R. Mowbray and Co. 7s. 6d.

"The Jesuits," wrote Macaulay, "invaded all countries which the great maritime discoveries of the preceding age had laid open to European enterprise. They were to be found in the depths of the Meruvian mines, at the marts of the African slave caravans, on the shores of the Spice Islands, in the Observatories of China."

Few people, however, today, even if interested in missions, could give any account of these activities. The book under review, though not limited to Jesuits, is a very successful endeavour to deprive us of an excuse for our ignorance.

The first Life is that of Las Casas, the Spanish Dominican who championed the cause of the oppressed Indians against their Spanish masters. Then follow the Lives of four Jesuits, Juan Fernandez, Matthew Ricci, Robert de Nobili, Jean de Brebœuf, illustrating respectively the missionary histories of Japan, China, India, and Canada. The last Life is that of François Pallu, missionary to Siam.

The Lives are interesting, and are enlivened by liberal quotations from contemporary writers. The book also contains some valuable appendices giving detailed information of particular missions.

The author, who is intimately connected with the modern missionary movement, is quick to show how some missionary problems of today were missionary problems in the seventeenth century. Of the Lives, two,

Ricci in China and Nobili in India, raise the still burning question of "accommodation," of making oneself "all things to all men." It is admitted that Ricci, in allowing Confucianism, and Nobili, in accepting the caste system, went too far in one direction. Enthusiastic missionaries, who announced, with what the author calls "a certain lack of discretion," that Confucius was in hell, went too far in the other. But to find the happy mean is no easier now than it was then.

One small omission may be noted. When pointing out that the French Société des Missions Etrangères, founded in 1658, preceded our own S.P.C.K. and S.P.G., he might have added that the Corporation for the Propagation of the Gospel in New England, known later as the New England Company, dates from 1649. This is a small matter, and we should like to thank the author for a thoroughly sound and useful work, which should be read by all who are interested in missions, and above all by those who seek to interest others in this cause.

C. P. S. CLARKE.

CHURCH SERVICES AND SERVICE BOOKS BEFORE THE REFORMATION. By the late Henry Barclay Swete, D.D. New edition, revised by Arthur John Maclean, D.D., Bishop of Moray, Ross, and Caithness. S.P.C.K. 5s.

The original edition of this book, based upon a course of lectures to ordinands, was published thirty-four years ago. During the intervening period it has taken its place as a standard work of reference and a valuable introduction to the study of the Prayer Book. Its attractive style and clear and simple exposition have commended it to many who would be deterred from the perusal of more technical works, though, like all Dr. Swete's books, it is marked by exact scholarship and wide knowledge. The Bishop of Moray has rendered valuable service in preparing this revised edition with the modifications and supplements rendered necessary by later discoveries and investigations. The new matter is marked by square brackets, and takes account of such later discoveries as the *Testament of our Lord*, the Sacramentary of Sarapion, and the more recent investigations into the history and relationships of the early Church Orders. The restraint with which the Bishop of Moray has carried out his task has made it possible, without interfering with the structure and charm of the original book, to increase its value as a present guide to the subject with which it deals.

J. H. SRAWLEY.

THE EUCHARISTIC CANON, WITH SUGGESTIONS FOR A POSSIBLE REVISION. By John Blomfield. S.P.C.K. 1930. 7s. 6d.

Dr. Lowther Clarke, in a foreword to this book, has explained its genesis and the circumstances of its publication. The author, who did not live to see its publication, had spent his ministerial life largely in pioneer work in Western Australia. Ordained late in life, and without the advantage of a university education, he became an ardent student of liturgical subjects, and had hoped to devote himself to the task of promoting Prayer Book revision in Australia and New Zealand. While his critical equipment was not always equal to the task of unravelling the many subtle and intricate problems of liturgy, his book shows signs of wide reading and extended knowledge of the documents. He was well acquainted with contemporary English liturgical work, though a fuller and more ex-

tended study of Mr. Edmund Bishop's *Liturgica Historica* and of his contributions to the *Journal of Theological Studies* might have led him to revise some of his conclusions. But his book contains a useful collection of materials which are not elsewhere accessible in so convenient a form. The results of recent research into the Early Church Orders, and the bearing of patristic evidence for the rite, as it developed in the different centres of Christendom, as well as the evidence of the rites themselves, are all set out and provide a useful survey of the facts. Dr. Lowther Clarke, who was left a free hand by the executors, has revised the manuscript, corrected a number of errors, and made certain excisions, while preserving all that is of real value in the author's work.

The plan of the book is to analyze the contents of the eucharistic prayer (the Canon or Anaphora) as it is found in the various rites, and by a study of its successive *momenta* to exhibit its *rationale* and sequence. This comparative study of the different elements of the eucharistic prayer, as it developed in East and West, is the most useful part of the book, and shows a wide range of study of the rites themselves. The author's judgment upon the facts is more open to criticism. His treatment of the evidence of the New Testament shows the limitations of his knowledge (and Dr. Lowther Clarke, in his footnotes, occasionally utters a *caveat* to the reader). The author adopts the plan common among older liturgical students (*e.g.* Hammond) of dividing up the eucharistic prayer, as found in the different rites, into well-defined sections, and thus constructing a kind of norm, by their correspondence (or lack of correspondence) to which the several rites are judged. For the particular purpose which he has in view, which is to produce, as he has done in his Appendix, suggestions for a revised Eucharistic Canon, this method may have advantages. But it is open to the criticism that it scarcely leaves scope for a dispassionate study of each rite on its merits, or of the peculiar genius and national temperament exhibited in it. In this matter, as in all historical studies, it is the question of historical background which is of importance, a fact which needs to be remembered in view of the recent Prayer Book controversy in England. While the author is anxious to be studiously fair in his presentation of the evidence, his partiality for the Eastern form of the rite, and his anxiety for the inclusion of an Epiclesis of the Holy Spirit in any revision of the service, prevent him from doing full justice to other forms of the rite, such as the Roman Canon and the Eucharistic service in the Book of Common Prayer.

But within these limits he has written an interesting book, which reveals at times the pastoral and devotional temper of the author. Those who knew him and admired his deep earnestness will be glad to possess it, and others who are unable to gain access to larger and more technical works will find set out the materials which are needed for the exercise of a proper judgment on the problems involved.

J. H. SRAWLEY.

THE VALIDITY OF ANGLICAN ORDINATIONS. By Mgr. Papadopoulos, Archbishop of Athens. Translated and prefaced by J. A. Douglas. Faith Press. 3s.

This is a translation of a series of articles which appeared in the official organ of the Confraternity of the Holy Sepulchre, and which were published in book form at Jerusalem so long ago as 1925. The value of the book lies in the demonstration it affords that, so far from being merely

swayed by those political motives by which certain critics would explain the readiness of the Orthodox to enter into a *rapprochement* with Anglicans, Orthodox theologians have studied this ecclesiastical problem in a spirit of scientific detachment and also with great thoroughness. The Archbishop cannot be accused of having failed to give due weight to the arguments advanced by Roman Catholic controversialists. His survey of the movement towards the recognition of English Ordinations, ending in 1923, of necessity leaves out of view the important assurance given by the English Bishops last year to the Orthodox delegation that "if there were any ambiguity in the XXXIX. Articles, they should be interpreted by what the Prayer Book itself said." The Eastern Church, the Archbishop assures us, has never questioned the external canonicity of Archbishop Parker's election and consecration, but since the sixth decade of the last century, it has been perplexed by the defective teaching, or at least the ambiguity, of the XXXIX. Articles. The explanations of the English Bishops at Lambeth last year satisfied the members of the Orthodox delegation: and the recent unconditioned recognition of English Orders by the Patriarch of Alexandria is a token of that satisfaction. In regard to the enumeration of the Sacraments as seven, no more and no less, we venture to think that no one who studies the English Order of Confirmation could doubt that that rite is sacramental in the sense that the Eastern Church understands the term, and it cannot be doubted that the Ordinal rests on the same basis as the Confirmation rite. The Eastern conception of a *Mysterion* as Divine power displaying itself in conjunction with a sign, differs from the conception of a sacrament which St. Augustine's rationalization of the sacraments administered outside the Church has established in scholastic theology. The Easterns, true to St. Cyprian, St. Firmilian, and the primitives, do not recognize as valid the sacraments of schismatics and heretics, except by an exercise of the Church's economy, or prerogative of stewardship, which can validate that which is in itself invalid. The Latin Church, however, has accepted the principles by which St. Augustine claimed for sacraments an almost independent life of their own, maintaining that as outward and visible signs they can be integral and valid "where the Holy Spirit is not." In regard to Holy Order, the Latin Church emphasizes a *potestas*, which becomes, as it were, a personal possession of the person on whom at Ordination it is bestowed; the Eastern Church stresses the Holy Spirit by whose illapse the Ordinand becomes the instrument of the Holy Spirit in the accomplishment of Christ's abiding priesthood within His Church. This is why Latin theologians, before liturgical science came to their rescue, set forth the doctrine that the words "*Accipe potestatem*," etc., constitute the *form* of Ordination to the priesthood, and the quasi-feudal tradition of instruments the *matter*; and why with them the laying-on of hands came to be regarded as a preliminary and preparatory, but not the essential, ceremony. The scholastic doctrine of matter and form transfers to a formula the sanctification which is effected by the Holy Spirit, and thus, as it were, favours a mechanical view of the sacraments. Archbishop Chrysostom employs the term "character," but it is difficult to believe that he employs it in the Western scholastic sense as the *res sacramenti* of Holy Order. On p. 12 he confuses the XIII. Articles of 1538 with the XLII. of 1553. The translator adds much interesting and important information in his footnotes.

WALTER K. FIRMINER.